The new fight on the periphery: Pakistan's Military relationship with the United States by Middleton, Samuel L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2004-06
The new fight on the periphery: Pakistan's Military
relationship with the United States
Middleton, Samuel L.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THE NEW FIGHT ON THE PERIPHERY: 











 Thesis Advisor:                       Peter R. Lavoy 





















 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 
i REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2004 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The New Fight on the Periphery: Pakistan’s Military 
Role in Supporting U.S. National Security Strategy 
6. AUTHOR(S) : Samuel L. Middleton 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis explains the military relationship between the United States and Pakistan in the context of 
their divergent national security interests.  During the Cold War, U.S. concerns focused on the global contest 
between democracy and communism.  In this competition, Pakistan was seen as an important ally.  However, 
Pakistan viewed India as its primary threat and considered global ideological concerns as secondary in importance. 
At times, each country benefited from the other, but neither ever fully met the other’s most important needs.  The 
United States did not support Pakistan in its wars with India and Pakistan did not confront communism except to 
help oust Afghani governments non-compliant with Pakistan’s interests.  Pakistan’s military held power for more 
than half of Pakistan’s existence and became the U.S.’ key ally in South Asia.  Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons distanced U.S. relations in the post-Cold War environment.  The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
catapulted Pakistan’s importance as an ally but at the cost of supporting a military regime and the erosion of a 
democratic government in Pakistan.  This thesis argues that Pakistan’s military now shares a relationship with the 
United States that builds regional stability but which may also hold political consequences in the United States. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
103 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Pakistan, United States, National Security Strategy, Pakistani Military, South Asia, Global War on 
Terrorism, Musharraf, Bush, Afghanistan, Taliban 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE NEW FIGHT ON THE PERIPHERY:  
PAKISTAN’S MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
Samuel L. Middleton 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.A., University of Washington, 1992 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Samuel L. Middleton 
 
 








James J. Wirtz 




























This thesis explains the military relationship between the United States and 
Pakistan in the context of their divergent national security interests.  During the Cold 
War, U.S. concerns focused on the global contest between democracy and communism.  
In this competition Pakistan was seen as an important ally.   However,   Pakistan viewed 
India as its primary threat and considered global ideological concerns as secondary in 
importance.  At times, each country benefited from the other, but neither ever fully met 
the other’s most important needs.  The United States did not support Pakistan in its wars 
with India and Pakistan did not confront communism except to help oust Afghani 
governments non-compliant with Pakistan’s interests.  Pakistan’s military held power for 
more than half of Pakistan’s existence and became the U.S.’ key ally in South Asia.  
Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons distanced U.S. relations in the post-Cold War 
environment.  The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 catapulted Pakistan’s 
importance as an ally but at the cost of supporting a military regime and the erosion of a 
democratic government in Pakistan.  This thesis argues that Pakistan’s military now 
shares a relationship with the United States that builds regional stability but which may 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
How does the Pakistani military support U.S. interests?  This question requires 
context to provide an understanding of the complex military infrastructure that defines 
Pakistan’s military institution and its relationship with Pakistan’s citizens.  Since its 
creation in 1947, Pakistan sought a relationship with the United States as an ally in South 
Asia.  As the Cold War emerged, Pakistan’s role as a peripheral ally evolved into a key 
element of the U.S. policy for the containment of communism thus providing the United 
States close access to the Soviet Union’s southern reaches.  However, this relationship 
underwent several fluctuations due to changes in leadership in both countries and the 
policies chosen by those leaders.  Pakistan’s military participated not only in the 
execution of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies, but also took the lead in the 
formulation of many of those policies.  For more than half of Pakistan’s existence, the top 
decision maker has been a serving military officer.  Even during periods of civilian rule, 
Pakistan’s military weighed heavily in the formulation of its foreign policy.  Finally, 
Pakistan’s military represents the only national institution that truly holds a favorable 
consensus of Pakistan’s society and imparts some degree of unity in a society full of 
religious rifts and ethnic schisms.  Pakistan’s military, therefore, plays a role in assisting 
the United States achieve its national security goals not only tactically or operationally, 
but even more importantly, it often acts as the country’s leadership.   
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the role of Pakistan’s military in assisting 
the United States in the implementation of current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 
goals.1  This evaluation is conducted in the context of the longstanding U.S.-Pakistani 
relationship.  Controversy rests on how capable Pakistan’s military institution is of 
supporting U.S. NSS goals.  Two important detractors currently exist that may preclude 
the full potential of support from Pakistan’s military institution.  The first is Pakistan’s 
fear of a hostile India intent on Pakistan’s collapse.  The second concerns the latent ties 
and sympathies that Pakistan’s military institution shows to the Taliban and other jihadis.  
For the purposes of this thesis, jihadi groups refer to the politically motivated militant 
                                                 
1 Previously, national security strategy goals were not necessarily spelled out in the National Security 
Strategies as is currently the form in the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002. 
2forces that typically use the defense of Islam or Muslims as the basis of their framing 
techniques.  Pakistan’s military employed some of these forces for over a decade to 
further its interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.  This thesis outlines Pakistan’s ability to 
support U.S. interests through a history of overshadowing divergence of U.S. and 
Pakistani national interests to gain cooperation.   
The scope of this paper includes, as a backdrop, U.S. and Pakistani diplomatic 
and military ties since Pakistan’s creation in 1947 to the present.  This thesis addresses 
the historical perspective; describes the Pakistani military ‘institution’; defines U.S. 
goals; and concludes by examining the role Pakistan’s military serves in assisting the 
United States in the implementation of its current national security goals.  This thesis 
explores the diplomatic-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan to 
illustrate points of convergence and divergence of national interests.  Cases include early 
vacillations ending with the misperceived South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
alliance; Pakistan’s desire to acquiring a nuclear capability; the Afghanistan War and its 
unintended consequences in the form of a military-ISI-Taliban linkage; and U.S.-
Pakistani diplomatic-military relations since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  A 
descriptive analysis will identify the nature of Pakistan’s military as well as explain the 
roles it played throughout each period, and which it continues to play today.  Sources 
remain unclassified drawing both on primary and secondary references.   
What do the U.S. national security goals require of the Pakistani military?  The 
United States must clearly articulate its needs in order for Pakistan to evaluate the U.S. 
requirements of its military.  What is the nature of complexity that constitutes Pakistan’s 
military?  Identification of Pakistan’s military infrastructure is required to determine what 
roles it can and cannot complete.  Beyond the physical constraints and limitations on the 
roles Pakistan’s military can conceivably accomplish, it must also take into account 
political, ethnic, and religious considerations.  How is Pakistan’s military institution 
assisting the United States in reaching its NSS goals?  Operation Enduring Freedom is 
made possible through the cooperation of Pakistan’s military.  Cooperative action and 
regional stability objectives are evidenced in Pakistan’s leading of a coalition of South 
Asian countries (Nepal and Bangladesh) on a United Nations (UN) mission in the Congo.   
3Each of these is direct military action resulting from the United States’ current NSS but 
may suffer from an intermittent ambiguity of domestic politics centering on Pakistan’s 
fears of India and possible sympathies towards the Taliban and other jihadis.   
The role of Pakistan’s military, serving as a longtime supporter of U.S. interests, 
remains constant despite the nature of war on the periphery.  Pakistan’s military proved 
to be invaluable in containing the external threat of Soviet communism.  Following the 
events of 9/11, Pakistan’s military once again proves invaluable. However, now it suffers 
from linkages of some elements to the very organizations that the United States opposes.  
Pakistan’s fear of a hostile India also continues to haunt Pakistan’s military decision 
making, drawing Pakistan’s military focus to its eastern border.  This thesis provides a 
context to understand U.S. and Pakistani military roles better as a result of national 
interests converging or diverging, and serves U.S. military commanders and staff officers 
assigned to duties in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  It also serves policy makers and officials 
within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
and the Department of State (DoS) assigned to positions relating to U.S.-Pakistani 
military cooperation.  This thesis depicts the degree to which previous U.S. interests were 
served and the continuing impact previous U.S. policies contributed to the South Asia 
region.  Given this historical perspective, policy makers may better analyze the 
implications of current and future policies.  Commanders and staff officers will be better 
able to understand their role in understanding and cooperating with Pakistani military 
officials.  Also, this thesis will explore the degree to which Pakistan’s military institution 
has made, and must continue to make, a complete breakaway from its previous support of 
the Taliban and jihadis as well as continue reconciliation and confidence building efforts 
with India. 
A. DIVERGENT INTERESTS 
The United States and Pakistan share a longstanding relationship that has 
vacillated during different eras.  U.S. and Pakistani interests diverged in 1950; converged 
in 1954; continually diverged over nuclear proliferation (although this subdued during the 
1980’s and currently); converged during the Afghanistan War; diverged in the 1990’s; 
and now teeter at the crossroads of supporting U.S. interests while risking domestic 
political schism.  Pakistan’s military typically determines Pakistan’s domestic and 
4foreign policies, even during times of civilian governance.  Pakistan supported U.S. 
interests so long as those interests did not preclude Pakistan from achieving its own 
goals.  Pakistani interests overrode U.S. interests during the Korean War and when 
Pakistan acquired nuclear technology and refused to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).  The Pakistani military deemed its nuclear program necessary and unavoidable.  
The Pakistani military now grapples with issues of defending its borders against India; 
preventing Indian and other external forces from undermining Pakistan’s ethnic splits; 
maintaining a Pakistani friendly government in Afghanistan; and extinguishing leftover 
linkages to the Taliban.   Some of these issues are found at the core of Pakistan’s interests 
that develop into divergent interests. 
U.S.-Pakistani relations over the years have vacillated between peaks and valleys.  
These vacillations have typically been explained as to whether or not U.S. interests and 
Pakistani interests converged or diverged.  This is not a valid argument.  If this 
explanation holds true, then Pakistan needs only to match its interests to those of the 
United States in order to enjoy close relations.  Similarly, the United States needs only to 
match its interests with Pakistan in order to enjoy the benefits of an ally in South Asia.  
At best, the interests of these two states have crossed only at a few points, which means 
that the United States and Pakistan have rarely shared common interests.2 
A better explanation is that both states held their own divergent interests and 
enjoyed close relations when both shared a common goal.  This common goal, however, 
shrouds an important understanding.  The purpose behind the goal is driven by each 
country’s divergent perspective.  Both the United States and Pakistan shared a united goal 
in the rejection of Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980’s. However, the reasons 
each chose to pursue this goal could not have been more divergent.  The United States 
supported a war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in order to contain communism.  
Pakistan supported a war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in order to maintain a hand 
in the control of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s ‘backyard’.  The ‘in order to’ portion of the 
                                                 
2 In 1950, Pakistan refused to send troops to assist the United States in Korea on the basis that Pakistan 
needed its troops at home to guard against possible Indian aggression.  Pakistan’s reluctance derived from 
the U.S. refusal to guarantee Pakistan’s safety against Indian aggression.  The United States was not willing 
to make this guarantee because President Truman did not see Pakistan as a vital interest.  He believed that 
an amicable relationship could exist between the two countries, but he did not see the benefit of a military 
obligation to Pakistan. 
5previous sentence distinguishes the actions and policies of these states from one another.  
Perspective drives each country’s goals and policies, but what happens when the common 
goal is achieved?  What is the end state vision of U.S. policy or, more pointedly, what is 
the result of the lack of an end state vision when the common goal is achieved and the 
United States leaves?  The United States must consider follow through policies after 
accomplishing its objectives in order to avoid unintended consequences. 
In this example of convergence of U.S. and Pakistani goals (not interests), the 
U.S. pulled its leadership role out of Afghanistan but continued to support Pakistan with 
minimal arms and viewed Pakistan with minimal interest.  The U.S. achieved its goal of 
rejecting the Soviets and allowed a political vacuum to run out of control instead of 
pursuing a longer lasting policy of rebuilding Afghanistan.  The shortsightedness of this 
policy allowed communist Afghans to retain power in Afghanistan despite the Soviet 
withdrawal.  It also allowed a civil war to develop as many states used Afghanistan to 
pursue their various agendas, none of which were conducive to rebuilding Afghanistan.  
The United States and Pakistan once again demonstrated that the chasm between each 
state’s divergent interests could diminish relations as evidenced at the end of the Afghan 
War. 
What were U.S. and Pakistani interests, why were they divergent, and how long 
had they been divergent?  U.S. and Pakistani divergence of interests develops from a 
contrast in perspective.  U.S. interests from 1947 to 1990 can be summarized as one of 
containing communism.  U.S. interests from 1990 to 2001 can be characterized as one of 
nuclear non-proliferation; preventing other nuclear powers from going to war (especially 
on the subcontinent); and global economic prosperity.  Pakistani interests from 1947 to 
1950 surfaced as seeking a U.S. guarantee of its safety against India.  From 1950 to 2001 
Pakistani interests meant building the capability to defend itself against a hostile India.  
Even the scale of interests diverged between the United States and Pakistan.  The U.S. 
concerned itself with a global issue while Pakistan remained solely focused on a regional 
issue.  This is not to dismiss the idea of Pakistan’s ability to provide the United States an 
anti-communist stronghold in South Asia.  Indeed, Pakistan often argued its location 
should be of great importance to the United States.  The United States both agreed with  
6and benefited from this fact.  However, this fact was merely a cross roads between 
Pakistan’s regional focus and the United States’ global focus. Still, no convergence of 
interests occurred.   
Can U.S. and Pakistani interests produce a long-term relationship built upon a 
common positive goal?  This thesis defines a positive goal as one that seeks to promote 
the welfare of each state rather than a common goal based on the presence of a common 
threat.  Perhaps an example of a collaborative effort towards peace rather than one 
designed around a defense against a common enemy can answer this question.  The 
United States viewed China as a communist enemy and gave Pakistan a cold shoulder 
when Pakistan began (under Ayub) moving closer to China.  However, this view changed 
when the United States (under Nixon) took a different look at China and initiated steps to 
establish U.S.-Chinese relations.  Pakistan’s relationship with China offered an avenue to 
begin a secret U.S.-Chinese dialog, which caused two issues to occur that brought the 
United States and Pakistan closer.  First, it brought Yahya Khan and the Nixon/Kissinger 
team closer together resulting in a more conciliatory relationship.  Second, it provided 
both a common goal although not a common purpose.  That goal was the establishment of 
détente with China. Pakistan established relations with China in order to solve its 
regional need for defense.  Nixon wanted to cultivate U.S.-Chinese relations in order to 
gain “a lever with Moscow to press for U.S.-Soviet détente.”3  Yet, after the Nixon/Ford 
presidencies gave way to the Carter presidency, U.S.-Pakistani relations reached an all 
time low as Pakistan’s search for a nuclear defense capability became a sticking point.  
Once again, even in the pursuit of a positive goal of establishing relations with China, 
U.S. and Pakistani divergent interests precluded a long-term, confident relationship.  Had 
the United States taken a long-term look at South Asian regional interests and paid 
attention to Pakistan’s perceived need for security against India, it may have prevented 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. 
Can U.S. and Pakistani interests ever be the same?  Possibly, but the trend in 
relations before 11 September 2001 demonstrates that any efforts toward a common goal 
cannot achieve a long-term positive relationship unless the purposes and interests 
                                                 
3 Dennis Kux,  The United States and Pakistan:  1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies. (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Press, 2001) 182. 
7overlap.  In order to produce a common goal with a common interest, the United States 
must address Pakistan’s regional and domestic concerns.  Pakistan must also broaden its 
scope to address global concerns and not allow regional concerns to be its predominant 
policy making factor.   
What does this mean in today’s effort in the GWOT in Pakistan and Afghanistan?  
U.S. efforts in the GWOT developed from a change in the U.S. national security strategy 
in 2002.  President Bush developed this new NSS based on the lessons learned from 
previous U.S. policies that revealed a lack of consideration for long-term impacts and 
possible unintended consequences.  The NSS of 2002 clearly articulates a requirement for 
the United States to consider the regional and domestic needs of its partners when 
developing policies for intervention and in the deployment of military forces abroad.  It 
further recognizes the importance of helping other governments establish the rule of law 
and to develop healthy economies as a goal and interest in producing security both in the 
United States and abroad for American citizens.  Simply put, it is in Pakistan’s best 
interests to meet its own domestic and regional interests in order to produce a stable, safe, 
and healthy state.  Pakistan does this by attempting to resolve its regional border issues 
that give rise to the sectarian, ethnic, criminal, and political violence that allows terrorist 
networks to flourish.  It is in the U.S. best interest to assist Pakistan in achieving its 
domestic and regional interests in order to produce a stable, safe, and healthy state, by 
instituting the provisions stipulated in its NSS.  For the first time in U.S.-Pakistani 
history, both states have an opportunity to seek the same goals for the same reason: to 
promote the health and vitality of Pakistan in order to provide domestic security of each 
state.  To achieve this goal and for both states’ interests to serve the same goal in the end, 
the United States must not conduct the GWOT without also providing support to 
Pakistan’s domestic and regional issues.  If the United States marks its success by 
eradicating terrorists and loses sight of the other issues facing Pakistan, then it will 
ultimately not succeed.  The United States is not alone in this partnership.  Pakistan’s 
contribution to the GWOT signaled a complete reversal of its politics of border 
contestation causing an upswing in both secessionist and religious extremist fervor.  The  
8policy’s greatest reversal has been Pakistan’s abandonment of the Taliban and the strain 
caused by this reversal between Pakistan and the Pashtuns, both in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.   
Finally, to what extent is the United States willing to support a military regime in 
Pakistan when the costs come in terms of eroding Pakistan’s democratic process?  The 
United States faces engendering criticism for supporting the postponement of democracy 
in order to fight for democracy.  This seemingly contradictory policy may work in the 
short term but what guarantees does the United States have for returning democracy to 
Pakistan? 
B. DEVEOPMENT OF THESIS 
Chapter II (Pakistan’s Military Support of U.S. NSS Goals 1947-1978) expounds 
the definition of Pakistan’s military by addressing its military organizational structure 
and capabilities.  The chapter addresses the introduction of the Interservices Intelligence 
(ISI) and its military linkage.  It also discusses the degree of the military’s political 
influence on domestic and foreign policy.  This chapter then proceeds to debate the points 
of convergence (the 1954 Alliance and President Nixon’s Chinese entente) as well as 
divergence (Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition aspirations, Kennedy’s Indian entente, and the 
1965 Pakistani-Indian War, President Carter’s anti-nuclear stance). 
Chapter III (Pakistan’s Military Support of U.S. NSS Goals 1979-2001) addresses 
changes to Pakistan’s military organizational structure, the strengthening role of the ISI, 
and greater military-ISI linkage.  It explains the degree of the military’s political 
influence on domestic and foreign policy.  Finally, it analyzes the points of convergence 
(Control of Afghanistan) and divergence (U.S. containment of Communism vs. Pakistani 
installation of a Pakistan friendly government; U.S. Proxy war vs. Pakistan’s direct war, 
which established the basis of linkages and sympathies of future Taliban members). 
Chapter IV (Pakistan’s Military Institution) provides a better understanding of the 
framework of Pakistan’s overarching military institution.  Encompassing more than the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force, Pakistan’s military includes a robust internal and external 
intelligence agency and owns Pakistan’s military industrial complex.  This chapter also  
9develops the structural history of Pakistan’s military institution and provides the basis for 
understanding why the Pakistani military is key to Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy 
arenas. 
Chapter V (Pakistan’s Military Support of U.S. NSS Goals 2001 and Beyond) 
illustrates a re-invigorated relationship as the result of the terrorist attack on 11 
September 2001 (9/11).  In response to the terrorist attack of 9/11, President Bush 
promulgated a revision to the NSS that articulates a new long-term policy akin to the 
Cold War.  This new global war on terrorism (GWOT) emphasizes the importance of the 
United State fighting this adversary in a peripheral setting.  U.S.-Pakistani history 
revolves around this relationship, thus reviving a past role but with new perspectives.  Of 
the seven goals that the U.S. NSS states, Pakistan’s military institution is most capable of 
fulfilling 1) championing aspirations for human dignity; 2) the strengthening of alliances, 
2) the diffusion of regional conflicts, 3) the prevention of enemies threatening the United 
States and its allies with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 4) the development of 
agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.  This chapter 
addresses how the United States intends to translate these goals into objectives that the 
Pakistani military can achieve.  Pakistan’s military provides significant opportunities for 
the United States in intelligence collaboration, provision of space for bases of operations, 
logistics support, and airspace over-flight consent.  This chapter illustrates the manner in 
which each of these areas is supported to assist the United States in its Operation 
Enduring Freedom, as well as embarking upon on the regional stability producing 
objectives that necessitate an expanding nature to Pakistan’s military roles.  Finally, this 
chapter answers the question of how Pakistan’s military supports U.S. interests in a post-
Bush presidency. 
Chapter VI (Conclusion) ties together the elements from Chapters II-V and draws 
a conclusion on how Pakistan’s military supports the United States in reaching the goals 
of its National Security Strategy.  Moreover, the conclusion illustrates the ramifications 
of President Bush’s policy of GWOT and whether or not it establishes the possibility of 
generating a convergence of interests that will produce long-term benefits to both  
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countries.  The conclusion is drawn that support of Musharraf’s regime should continue 
in the near- to medium-term, but that efforts must be made to re-establish democracy in 




II. PAKISTAN’S MILITARY SUPPORT OF U.S. INTERESTS 
1947-1978 
What role did Pakistan’s military play in assisting the United States in achieving 
its national security goals?  This chapter illustrates the degree to which Pakistani military 
involvement in Pakistan’s domestic politics, governance, and foreign policy contributed 
or detracted from achieving U.S. national security goals.  The following questions 
facilitate illustrating Pakistan’s military assistance.  What points of divergence precluded 
its military from being more successful?  What choices did the United States make that 
precluded its military from assisting the United States in reaching its national security 
goals?   
Pakistani and Indian independence from Britain immediately led to sovereignty 
issues over Kashmir leading to the first Indo-Pakistani war.  From this conflict, Pakistan 
realized its need for another state to provide a guarantee of military support to ensure 
Pakistan’s territorial integrity.  Pakistan’s emergence coincided with the heightening of 
the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, which is to say between 
democratic and communist ideologies.  Of these ideologies, Pakistan’s embryonic 
democracy readily sought a partnership with the United States, and by the early 1950’s, 
began its role as a front-line partner to oppose Soviet communism on the periphery of the 
U.S. policy.  Initially, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan announced a policy of 
neutrality but quickly sought U.S. favor after the United States invited Indian PM Nehru 
to visit.  This same invitation also alerted the Soviets to U.S. involvement in a region that 
it had previously disregarded as pro-Western but not posing a threat.  The Soviets feared 
that the United States would secure access to the Soviet’s southern “under belly”.  These 
events set the scene for more than 40 years of a relationship characterized by Pakistan’s 
willingness to assist the United States counter Soviet communism in return for a U.S. 
guarantee of security from India.   
A. U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS 1947-1978 
The United States found itself increasingly dispersed throughout the world after 
the Second World War.  As the Cold War began to gain ground, the United States faced a 
communist threat in Greece, supported the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, advocated a 
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peaceful settlement in Palestine which turned into a war of independence for the new 
state of Israel in 1947, and monitored the Chinese civil war of 1947.  The creation of 
Pakistan by truncating India in 1947 seemed to pale in comparison to other issues 
preoccupying U.S. interests.  India’s partition added to U.S. concerns as the United States 
immediately found that the Indo-Pakistani animosity created a bi-polar region that could 
not be reconciled and forced the United States to choose between Pakistan and India as 
its host nation to pursue Cold War policies.  President Truman’s administration favored 
Indian assistance, but India rebuffed attempts to be wooed into what it considered another 
form of foreign domination. 
B. STRUGGLE FOR ALLIANCE 1947-1953 
President Truman’s pursuit of an Indo-American alliance continued through the 
late 1940’s but India maintained a policy of non-alignment and would not join an 
alliance.  Pakistani PM Liaquat visited the United States in 1950 to educate Americans 
about Pakistan and to seek economic assistance and business support.  While he was still 
in the United States, the threat of communism erupted on the Korean peninsula when 
communist forces attacked through Seoul and began to push U.S. and Korean national 
forces south to Pusan.  Pakistan responded favorably in a United Nations (UN) assembly 
vote for international support to fight the communist assault.  Egypt abstained from this 
vote clearing the way for Pakistan to assume a role of drawing support in Muslim 
countries for the U. S. led effort in Korea.4  However, U.S.-Pakistani relations came to a 
point of divergence. 
The first Indo-Pakistani War of 1948-1949 over claims to Kashmir inculcated 
Pakistan’s leadership with a determination to provide security against a hostile India.  
During 1950-1951, Pakistan spent 50-75% of its budget on defense5.  During this same 
period, Truman asked Liaquat for troops in support of the Korean War.  Liaquat declined 
on the basis that India presented a threat to Pakistan’s existence and therefore he could 
not support the U.S. request unless the United States guaranteed Pakistan’s security.  
Truman primarily would not concede because he feared this would, at a minimum, 
                                                 
4 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000, 33-38. 
5 Christophe Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and its Origins, (London: Anthem Press: Wimbledon 
Publishing Company, 2002) 69. 
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infuriate India and possibly even push India into a pro-Soviet stance.  This early point of 
divergence of national interests characterized the U.S.-Pakistani relationship that 
continues today.  Pakistan clearly held a regional view of national interest while the 
United States pursued a policy of containing communism globally.  Pakistan feared a 
territorial threat while the United States feared an ideological threat. 
C. DEFENSE PACTS AND MILITARY ALLIANCES WITHOUT 
GUARANTEEING PAKISTAN’S SECURITY 1954-1958 
By 1954, India’s continuing intransigence drove Pakistan to make a decision to 
gain sorely needed financial support and military hardware.  Desperate to maintain an 
army end strength large enough to defend Pakistani borders, Pakistan eagerly began 
seeking U.S. support.  The $29M military aid package the United States offered 
disappointed Pakistani Commander in Chief General Ayub who expected 10 times that 
amount.  His protestations resounded within the government and caused the United States 
to reconsider its offer.  Over time, the U.S. offer rose to $171M over three years in 
military aid and another $105M in economic and other aid.6  In 1954, Nazimuddin, 
Pakistan’s new PM after Liaquat’s assassination in 1951, agreed to enter into a defense 
arrangement with the United States.  This arrangement included the sale of arms to 
Pakistan and allowed the training of Pakistani officers in the United States but fell short 
of promising a U.S. guarantee of Pakistan’s security.7  Later in 1954, Pakistan signed the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which finally meant an alliance with the 
United States, but with the purpose of halting the spread of communist expansion in 
Southeast Asia, not for defense against India.8  Pakistan then signed the U.S. Baghdad 
Pact in 1955, which provided for a seemingly united Muslim (Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan)  
 
                                                 
6 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan, (New 
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line of defense against Soviet expansion in Southwest Asia but which also did not 
provide for Pakistan’s security.9  For its cooperation, Pakistan received $650 million in 
military aid from the United States over 10 years.10   
These two defense pacts and the treaty all failed to provide Pakistan the security it 
desired although it did provide some financial and military materiel support.  Instead, 
these treaties favored the U.S. policy of containing communism.  Although U.S.-
Pakistani relations looked good on paper, they did not meet the needs of Pakistan, and 
therefore, did not provide the strongest guarantee that would prove useful to containing 
communism in the long term.  Indeed, the Baghdad Pact suffered its first blow in 1958 
when Iraq withdrew and SEATO disbanded altogether later in 1977.  
D. PAKISTAN’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 1958-1971 
Jinnah’s leadership marked two elements that helped condition Pakistan for 
military leadership.  First, Jinnah set a precedence of consolidating all authority into his 
office rather than fostering a truly representative form of democracy11, which continued 
with the next three governor-generals during the following decade.  This made Ayub’s 
coup and his resulting authoritarian leadership easier to accept.  Second, Jinnah did not 
favor an Islamic government, nor did he oppose it, but he believed that a secular 
government would provide the basis for a democracy that could chose to be either secular 
or Islamic.  As Egypt started to dominate the Arab world and thereby a large portion of 
the Islamic world, Pakistan took its first step towards forming a secular identity, 
increasingly defined by its secular government and by aligning itself with the United 
States.   
Nine years after Pakistan’s creation, Pakistan adopted its constitution in March 
1956 and Mirza became its first President.  Two years later, Mirza abrogated the 
constitution and declared martial law.  Four Governor Generals and seven PM’s served 
between 1947 and 1958, when the Chief Marshal Law Administrator (CMLA) General 
Mohammed Ayub Khan assumed Presidency.  Pakistan would not see democracy again 
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until 1971, and the ability of Pakistan’s military leadership to define the country’s foreign 
policy and domestic economy began.  In an era of tumultuous political leadership, the 
civil service in the form of the military asserted itself to bring order to Pakistan.  Ayub 
continued Jinnah’s precedents of centralized authority and secularization of the 
government.12   
Ayub desired to continue relations with the United States, but he emphasized 
ensuring Pakistan’s foreign policy would benefit Pakistan.  The three criticisms of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy that concerned him centered on Pakistan’s alignment with the 
United States which: 
offered no military protection against India; …no prospect of any 
diplomatic pressure for a referendum on Kashmir; and it compromised 
pan-Islamic solidarity by making Pakistan look like an ally of imperialism 
against the upsurge of Arab nationalism13 
Ayub decided to find ways to secure Pakistan’s national interests by multilaterally 
engaging other countries without cutting Pakistan off from the United States completely.  
His first shift in foreign policy opened the door to talks with China in 1961.   
President Kennedy reassessed U.S. interests in South Asia and proceeded with a 
policy of rapprochement with India, which suffered from failing ties to China.  Having 
the effect of a zero-sum game, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship began to falter.  The United 
States maintained its aid and Pakistan remained in both SEATO and the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO)14 but diminished commitments under these organizations.  India 
maintained its non-alignment stance but increasingly engaged in talks with the United 
States.  In 1962, China attacked Kashmir and immediately traded certain territories with 
Pakistan.  India lost territory, as new borders were drawn increasing tensions and 
triggering an Indian military buildup. India would not be caught off guard again.  
Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis the United States soured dramatically to the point that Ayub 
sent Zulfiqar Ali (Z.A.) Bhutto to Kennedy’s funeral rather than attend it himself.   
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Although the United States continued to provide Pakistan with war materiel, 
Ayub was not able to persuade the United States to pressure India into allowing a 
plebiscite in Muslim dominated Kashmir to determine the will of the people.  At the time, 
the United States competed with the Soviets to win over Indian leadership and did not 
want to risk losing influence over a known political hotspot.  Realizing the status quo that 
the United States was determined to maintain, Ayub believed that the only hope of 
achieving Pakistan’s irredentist claim to Kashmir lay in militarily assisting a general 
uprising against its Indian occupation.  He further believed that this action would remain 
completely within the Kashmir region.  On 1 September 1965, without consulting the 
United States, Ayub ordered the action executed.  Two of his assumptions were proven 
wrong.  First, India retaliated by opening a second front along Pakistan’s eastern border.  
Second, the United States stopped military assistance to both Pakistan and India since 
Ayub’s actions excluded U.S. involvement in planning and political considerations.15   
The war ended 22 days later with Pakistan making no gains.  The Soviet Union 
brokered the peace talks, the UN did not broach the subject of a referendum for 
Kashmiris, and Pakistan’s prestige diminished in the eyes of Americans.  The Second 
Indo-Pakistani War weakened Pakistan’s military and its ability to gain diplomatic 
support in the international arena.  Much to the chagrin of the United States, Ayub would 
not consider formulating a defense plan that would incorporate an Indo-Pakistani pact.  
He based his reasoning not only on mistrust of Indian cooperation, but more importantly, 
because it meant building an Indo-Pakistani defense agreement against communism.16  
The United States may have succeeded in diminishing Indo-Pakistani hostilities if it had 
focused on the issues causing the problems and centered less on U.S.-Soviet strategy.  
Ayub brought the divergence of U.S. and Pakistani interests to the forefront of the 
international arena by initiating the Second Indo-Pakistani War but failed to achieve the 
desired strategic and diplomatic results because of his misplaced assumptions.  Relations 
between the United States and Pakistan diminished, especially as the United States began 
to focus on the Vietnam conflict.  In March of 1969, Ayub resigned and General Agha 
Mohammed Yahya Khan assumed the role of CMLA and the presidency. 
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E. U.S. AND PAKISTANI INTERESTS 1971-1978 
General Yahya Khan put an end to the One Unit plan17 paving the way to 
proportional representation as he resigned in favor of democracy.  Pakistan held nation 
wide elections in December of 1970.  The votes in Pakistan’s eastern wing (now 
Bangladesh) represented a consolidated Bengali voter block greater than the voter block 
of contiguous West Pakistan.  West Pakistani votes were fractionalized, but ultimately 
favored Z. A. Bhutto, an ethnic Sindhi.  Thus, the East Pakistani candidate won the 
election and should have become president but Pakistan’s fresh start in democracy went 
awry.  Z. A. Bhutto would not concede Pakistan’s leadership to a Bengali.  Riots 
followed in East Pakistan and Z. A. Bhutto convinced Yahya Khan (still the president) to 
intercede militarily to quell the riots.  By March of 1971, East Pakistan attempted to 
secede and a civil war ensued.  The millions of refugees fleeing into India caused such a 
drain on India’s system that in December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan.  The United 
States intervened to assist the humanitarian problems and to ensure West Pakistan did not 
disintegrate.18  India immediately recognized Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan.  
In the aftermath, General Yahya Khan resigned and Z. A. Bhutto became President.19   
South Asia’s Third Indo-Pakistani War resulted in the territorial loss of Pakistan 
although the United States provided for West Pakistan’s survival.  From a Pakistani’s 
perspective, the United States did not do enough to intervene to save Pakistan’s territorial 
integrity from what it considered a hostile Indian aggression.  The United States could 
not risk entering Bangladesh to attempt to prevent the civil war that ensued.  U.S.-
Pakistani relations were never closer than under the Nixon-Yahya Khan team.  Nixon 
built his Asian foreign policy on the foundation that Yahya Khan provided, especially in 
the secret meeting in China that opened the door for follow-on U.S.-Chinese relations.  
Even while Congress voted to cut funding to Pakistan, Nixon strove to increase funding 
to an ally that secured U.S. national security interests in South Asia.  Congress may have 
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acted differently had Pakistan’s civil war somehow been fashioned in the Cold War terms 
of anti-communist.  Yahya Khan’s decision to knuckle down on the Bengalis only served 
to inflame a situation already out of hand.  This situation started as an abrogation of the 
democratic process but soon surfaced as regional Indo-Pakistani hostility.  Military 
involvement at Z. A. Bhutto’s behest came too late and too weak to be effective and 
served only to waste lives.  Yahya Khan’s military involvement spelled the end of the 
military’s ability to assist the United States achieve U.S. national security interests as Z. 
A. Bhutto shunned U.S. ambitions.   
Further driving a wedge between the United States and Pakistan was Z. A. 
Bhutto’s aspirations for acquiring nuclear weapons capability.  The nuclear program 
became a new portion of Pakistan’s military institution by 1974.  This singular portion of 
Pakistan’s military caused, and continues to cause, a disruption of U.S. interests in South 
Asia.  Command and control issues and the lack of declaring a nuclear-use policy are at 
the core of Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons.  President Ford continued Nixon’s 
goodwill with Pakistan working to lift embargoes and other restrictions on military arms 
but President Carter did not continue in this approach.  Instead, Carter followed the 
Pressler Amendment precluding military support and other forms of aid to countries 
possessing nuclear weapons but which refuse to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
At this stage of Carter’s presidency, the United States could afford to dominate this 
divergence of U.S.-Pakistani interests.  This would change, however, in 1979 and 
discussed in Chapter III. 
F. DEGREE OF MILITARY’S INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC POLICY 
How much of a political ‘party’ did Ayub’s military regime become?  Pakistan’s 
principal moderate Islamic party was Mawdudi’s Jama’at-I-Islami.  Mawdudi realized the 
JI’s diminutive nature and the need to form a coalition to challenge Ayub’s position.  In 
doing so, the JI established a trend in forming alliances to achieve its goals, a truly 
democratic principle.  Harder to swallow, the JI’s coalition partner to challenge Ayub 
Khan in the upcoming elections in 1965 insisted on a woman (Fatimah Jinnah) as its 
candidate.  Mawdudi convinced the JI’s leadership to change its doctrine regarding the 
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role of women in public office.20  Ayub’s ‘party’ in this instance contributed to the 
democratization of Pakistan.  Since military force would decimate radicalized elements, 
the only true competition that could challenge Ayub had to emerge through consensus 
and moderation.  As relations between the United States and Pakistan diminished, Ayub 
Khan resigned and General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan assumed the role of CMLA 
and the presidency in March of 1969.   
Mawdudi urged the party to exert political pressure to cause an Islamic 
democracy (i.e., traditional and modern ideas) without falling into the trap of 
radicalization.  This resulted in preventing Pakistan from polarizing into secular and 
religious camps.  At the same time, it continued to stoke the coals of an anti-authoritarian 
position that ultimately helped to force elections in 1970.  Despite the JI’s anti-
authoritarian stance, the JI sided with the army in 1971 to preserve the unity of Pakistan 
during the civil war that created Bangladesh, and thus solidifying the JI’s nationalist 
position.21   
What role does Pakistan’s military play in Pakistani domestic politics?  Pakistan’s 
military represents an element of its society that brokers power.  If this segment of 
Pakistani society becomes disenfranchised, it resolves itself to establishing its own 
justice.  In August of 1973, Z. A. Bhutto established a new constitution and became PM 
with Chaudhry Fazal Elahi as the new president.  The next year, he hosted the second 
Islamic Summit.  Although these events indicate the establishment of real democracy and 
the narrowing of the religious-secular gap between society and government, Z. A. 
Bhutto’s rule followed the familiar patterns of corruption and strict control reminiscent of 
earlier civilian leaders.  His replacement of civil servants with those fitting his political 
interests caused a politicization of civil posts and added a new level of corruption to the 
one thread that traditionally stabilized Pakistan’s governance.22  
Elections in March 1977 proved to be the most democratic process yet as a 9-
party coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), challenged Z. A. Bhutto’s Pakistan 
Peoples Party (PPP) and offered the first hope of a government based on political 
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compromise.23  Although Pakistanis and the United States felt the election would favor 
the PNA, Z. A. Bhutto’s PPP won 99% in the Punjabi districts.  This caused an outcry 
over rigged elections as these districts historically supported the PPP’s opponents.  
Pakistan’s military, and the army in particular, is ethnically Punjabi.  Not only was there 
an outcry against rigged elections, it came from the one facet of Pakistan’s society that 
could oust Z. A. Bhutto’s regime.  Months of political impasse resulted in a deteriorating 
civil society, and Operation Fair Play, the military’s answer to a failed political system, 
broke the disorder on 5 July 1977.  Martial law under Army Chief of Staff General 
Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq began in July 1977, and in September, he replaced Chaudhry as 
president.24  Pakistani domestic politics must consider Pakistan’s military as a party in 
and of itself.  If this ‘party’ should become disenfranchised it reacts quickly and 
decisively. 
G. DEGREE OF MILITARY’S INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC POLICY 
Pakistan’s first authoritarian military initiated impressive reforms with a 
macroeconomic perspective.  First, the ISI was largely shut down and replaced with an 
administrative body focused on implementing Ayub’s policies and included an economic 
analysis capability (the Planning Commission) charged with producing five-year plans.  
Second, Ayub channeled resources to stimulate growth in Pakistan’s industrial capacity 
targeting private rather than public industry.  Third, he launched the Export Bonus 
System (EBS) for industrial exports that paid a subsidy to the manufacturer in order to 
keep the price competitive internationally.  However, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war 
brought sanctions and a loss of foreign aid compensated for through import controls, 
which reduced growth.25   
The end result shows an impressive gross national product (GNP) rate of growth 
that almost doubles that of the previous period under civilian governance at nearly six 
percent over the period but at a drastic cost.  Real wages in both the industrial and 
agricultural sectors rose during the 1961-1973 period, and there was no gap in real 
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income in these sectors in the decade 1960-1970.26  The downside casts a bleaker shadow 
as wealth distribution worsened as evidenced by the increase in the absolute and relative 
number of Pakistanis living in poverty and only a two percent increase in real wages 
during that period.  Ayub suppressed wage increases to maximize industries’ investment 
opportunities in hopes of an economic take-off.  EBS subsidies promoted inefficiencies in 
industry.  Balance of payment problems continued as the costs of importing raw 
industrial materials was more than the amount exported.  Worse, Ayub essentially 
reinforced comparative disadvantage through subsidies and relied on exogenous financial 
flows as payment.  Pakistan began to rely heavily on foreign aid rising from 2.8 percent 
to 6.6 percent of the GNP from 1960 to 1965.  On a good note, technological 
improvement in grains, chemical fertilizers, and tractorization enhanced productivity, 
thus forestalling an impending food crisis.  This agricultural industrialization favored 
large commercial farms (and their ownership) and further spread wealth distribution 
inequality.27 
H. CONCLUSION 
From Pakistan’s creation, the United States was preoccupied with containing 
communism in Turkey and Greece and with rebuilding Europe in the wake of the Second 
World War.  The United States initially placed South Asia on the back burner as the 
Soviets did not make intimations towards this area that it considered pro-West.  This 
rapid reconciliation of U.S. and Pakistani national security interests never came to 
fruition.  Instead, they agreed to assist one another but not for a common purpose.  After 
making initial agreements in the early 1950’s, U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan remained 
mostly unconcerned until the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war and that focus lasted only 
momentarily until the promise of democracy arose in 1970 only to be jaded by a 
usurpation of democracy which led to Pakistan’s truncation.   
Civilian governance lasted from 1947 to 1958 and again from 1973 to 1977, 
representing only 15 years of a 30-year period.  The United States supported military 
regimes and continued to benefit from Pakistan’s role as a front-line state in containing 
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communism.  U.S. support of Pakistan’s military regimes did not engender much more 
than India’s inconsequential protest, which the United States disregarded due to India’s 
pursuance of its policy of non-alignment.  In a world that the United States perceived in 
Cold War terms, India’s non-alignment policy was tantamount to being anti-American.  
In fact, General Ayub supported U.S. policies far more than the civilian governments did 
even when the United States declined to support Pakistan fully in 1965.  More 
impressive, Ayub’s attempt at establishing a macroeconomic plan based on private rather 
than public ownership investment grounded on a five-year plan provided a dramatic 
growth in Pakistan’s economy.   
Early civilian governance, on the contrary, changed so rapidly that the U.S. 
ambassador remained busy ensuring U.S. policies would be continued from government 
to government.  Elected regimes’ corruption, incompetence, and lack of political coalition 
led to the instability that was their undoing.  The longest standing elected regime, Z. A. 
Bhutto’s, violated democratic principles and human rights and chafed against President 
Carter’s nuclear nonproliferation position and human rights advocacy.28  Points of 
divergence surfaced initially by the United States looking to India first while discounting 
Pakistan’s value as an ally, further divided by Pakistan’s insistence on a U.S. guarantee 
of Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis a regional threat rather than the ideological threat of 
communism.  Ayub’s decision to fight a regional war and Yahya Khan’s military action 
in East Pakistan became sticking points in U.S.-Pakistani relations and began to delay 
U.S. assistance to Pakistan.  Finally, Pakistan’s military incorporated the development 
and methods of employment of nuclear weapons in its structure, becoming the single 
most difficult barrier to the fulfillment of U.S. interests in South Asia.   
During this period, it made political sense for the United States to support military 
regimes as well as assist in the democratic efforts of a budding democracy despite the 
divergence in each countries’ national security interests.  The United States stopped short 
of supporting Pakistan in 1965, and 1971 because the impact of supporting Pakistan’s 
military regimes during these times would have detracted from the U.S. credibility.  
Pakistan’s instigation of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War did not incorporate U.S. 
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cooperation in the planning stages and therefore did not consider the impact on U.S. 
international and domestic politics.  The United States wisely distanced itself from an ally 
that did not consider the ramifications of U.S. involvement.  The 1971 Indo-Pakistani 
War again meant that the United States had to evaluate its position and ultimately decided 
that U.S. credibility would be lost in supporting the suppression of democracy.  The 
conclusion to be drawn from U.S.-Pakistani relations during this period is that there are 
limits to the support that the United States will provide to military regimes in Pakistan 
when either democratic principles would be compromised or when U.S. political interests 
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III. PAKISTAN’S MILITARY SUPPORT OF U.S. INTERESTS 
1979-2001 
Nixon’s presidency witnessed U.S. and Pakistani interests arriving at a crossroads 
that continued under President Ford.  These relations, however, did not survive Carter’s 
presidency as the issue of Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear capability became problematic.  
The harsh measures of Zia’s Islamization program, along with Z.A. Bhutto’s execution, 
further widened the chasm between these two leaders.  U.S. and Pakistani relations were 
arguably at their lowest point.  The overthrow of Afghanistan’s king by communist 
Afghanis changed this picture.  Soviet involvement in 1980 provided impetus to U.S.-
Pakistani cooperation to defeat a common threat.  However, the common threat of Soviet 
intervention did not represent a common goal.  The United States sought to contain 
communism.  Pakistan sought to emplace a Pakistani friendly regime in Afghanistan.  
The different goals meant differing visions of an end-state.  The conclusion of the 
Afghanistan war left a power vacuum fought over by tribal and political factions and left 
two million Afghani refugees in Pakistan with no economic prospects.  A civil war 
followed in Afghanistan that continued until the mid-1990’s, when one group began to 
rise above the many ethnic factions to establish a resemblance, however tribal, of order.  
Pakistan supported this rising group called the Taliban as the pivotal player in Pakistan’s 
Afghanistan policy.  The legacy of the Afghanistan War continues to haunt U.S. and 
Pakistan foreign policies today. 
To what degree did Pakistan’s military assist the United States in achieving its 
goals and what were the long-term effects of its military’s leadership?  The following 
questions reveal the effects of divergence of U.S. and Pakistani interests set against a 
background of peripheral threats.  These questions also illustrate how Pakistani military 
decisions affect Pakistan’s domestic politics and economy, which then impacts its ability 
to support U.S. goals.  How did Pakistan’s military affect U.S. interests during Carter’s 
presidency?  How did the Iranian Revolution affect the Pakistani military’s ability to 
support U.S. interests in the short term and in the long term?  How does the Afghanistan 
War prove divergence of interests despite Pakistan’s military regime supporting U.S. 
interests?  How did the Pakistani military’s regime goals differ from U.S. goals and what 
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impact did this have on U.S. interests in the post-Afghanistan War period?  What impact 
did Pakistan’s military regime have on its foreign policy and domestic politics and how 
did this affect U.S. interests?  What impact did Pakistan’s military have on its economy 
and how did this affect U.S. interests? 
A. U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS: 1977-1981 
How did Pakistan’s military affect U.S. interests during Carter’s presidency?  
President Carter’s administration desired to gain better relations with India but India’s 
interruption of the democratic process precluded this undertaking.  Only after India’s 
resumption of elections and an end to emergency powers enacted under Indira Gandhi 
could Carter invest in overtures towards India.  Simultaneous with Indian elections, 
General Zia staged a coup resulting in Pakistan’s second period of military governance 
and which drove a wedge between Zia and the Carter administration.  U.S. goodwill 
shifted from Pakistan to India becoming readily apparent as President Carter visited India 
but failed to visit Pakistan.  Additionally, Zia’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons 
resulted in the loss of an annual $50 million in aid under the Glenn Act previously 
waived under President Nixon.  The burning of the U.S. embassy by an angry crowd 
coupled with the Pakistani army responding uncharacteristically too late underscored the 
situation.29   
1. Iranian Revolution 
How did the Iranian Revolution affect the Pakistani military’s ability to support 
U.S. interests in the short term and in the long term?  The Iranian Revolution 
significantly impacted both U.S. and Pakistani interests.  The Iranian Revolution 
disrupted U.S. interests in the region in three important ways.  First, the United States lost 
influence in Iran’s government when the Shah fled Iran.  Re-installing the Shah became 
too difficult as Khomeini’s support swelled amongst Iranians.  Second, the United States 
lost its listening complex at Badaber.  This facility represented a key intelligence 
gathering center for the United States intent on Soviet activities.  Third, the failed 
military attempt to rescue American hostages only worsened U.S. prestige.  Not having a 
viable military option forced Carter into secret negotiations with Ayatollah Khomeini in 
order to return the hostages after more than a year in captivity.  Carter quickly came to 
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realize that the United States needed a regional partner.  Carter gained Zia’s support in 
the form of a listening post sans personnel within Pakistan’s borders and the two leaders 
authorized intelligence gathering cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence (ISI).  Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan, however, induced President Carter to restart the bilateral security 
agreements of 1959 and provide some assistance to Pakistan.30  Zia, however, did not feel 
Carter’s paltry assistance to be enough to warrant full cooperation.  Zia declined any 
further assistance as the presidential elections loomed near with Ronald Reagan the 
expected winner.   
The Iranian Revolution disrupted Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies.  In 
Pakistan, Iran’s support for Shi’ites resulted from Zia’s Sunni-centric Islamization 
program.  Zia announced his Islamization program in February 1979 by introducing the 
Islamic penal code to Pakistan.  More importantly, he established government incentives 
popularizing madrassahs or religious schools, which utilized rote memorization to instill 
a strict Sunni Muslim indoctrination.31  These schools produced ardent militants rather 
than creative thinkers better suited for civil roles.  At first, these schools provided a 
method of education that the Pakistani government could not afford.  However, the 
emphasis changed after the Iranian Revolution, driven by Shi’a Muslims, caused great 
concern in the Pakistani government.  Zia feared that Iran’s Shi’a uprising would spread 
to Pakistan causing social upheaval and intensifying a movement for an Islamic 
theocracy.   
Zia’s Islamization program intended to contain domestic Shi’a activity, to 
undermine the Shi’a activists in Afghanistan and to contain Shi’a activism in Iran by 
using Afghanistan as a buffer.  The upsurge in Sunni activism because of Zia’s 
Islamization program, however, further sparked Shi’a activism in otherwise neutral Shi’a 
Muslims.  Iranian religious agents organized Shi’a activism in Pakistan.  Zia’s Sunni bias 
blanketed Pakistan’s society making it difficult for Shi’a Muslims to obtain government 
jobs, services and other normally allotted rights and served to inflame Shi’a activism 
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further.  Sectarian militancy increasingly became the norm32 as “sectarianism [became] a 
form of religio-political nationalism, and as such…related to discussions of identity 
mobilization and ethnic conflict.”33  Islamic sectarian violence became a domestic and 
international issue.  Pakistan’s military often stabilized areas when sectarian violence 
paralyzed local police forces. 
A third impact of the Iranian Revolution on both the United States and Pakistan 
came in the form of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.  In 1978, communist Afghanis 
rose to power when they overthrew Afghanistan’s king.  The Soviets,not greatly invested 
in this communist government, did not see it as a key element in communist expansion.  
The Iranian Revolution, however, empowered an Islamic (Shi’ite) movement that sought 
to overthrow the communist Afghani government.  The Soviets intervened not so much to 
protect the Afghani communists, but rather to suppress an Islamic movement that could 
potentially spread to the surrounding Soviet satellites and exacerbate ethnic and religious-
political schisms. 
B. AFGHANISTAN WAR 1981-1988 
Iraq’s Sunni leadership and Saudi Arabia’s monarchy, both always fearful of 
Shi’a uprisings, also sought to contain Iran’s Shi’a expansion.  Both provided economic 
assistance to Pakistan to establish madrassahs.  This intra-Islamic sectarian violence 
escalated into the realm of the Cold War by threatening religious-political sectarian 
militancy in the Soviet Union’s southern reaches.  Organizers from revolutionary Iran 
encouraged Shi’a activism in Afghanistan to eject communist control.  Afghanistan’s 
borders were originally created as a buffer between British and Russian empires and 
continued into the Cold War under neither a western nor Soviet sphere of influence.  
Soviet military occupation removed Afghanistan’s place as a buffer region and prompted 
responses from the United States and Pakistan.  Pakistan’s ISI, strengthened under Zia, 
would lead Pakistan’s front-line war against the Soviets while the United States 
supported Pakistan with financial and materiel support.  How does the Afghanistan War 
prove divergence of interests despite the Pakistani military regime supporting U.S. 
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interests?  Under President Reagan, U.S.-Pakistani relations flourished as both countries 
shared a common interest in ridding Afghanistan of communists.  The divergence in 
purposes, however, would lead to unintended consequences that neither country foresaw. 
The Soviet response to subdue Shi’a activism in Afghanistan firmly focused U.S. 
attention on what appeared to be a Soviet expansion of communism.  Leary of an 
extended and costly war, the Reagan administration formulated a plan that relied on 
Pakistan to fight communist expansion as a periphery element in the U.S. policy of 
containment.  Zia’s perspective on the goals of the Afghanistan War differed from the 
U.S. perspective.  Rather than fighting a war of containment against communism, 
Pakistan fought for an Afghan government acquiescent to Pakistan by becoming the 
Mujahideen’s sponsor by doling out U.S. and Saudi generated funds.34  
Despite these differences, the United States and Pakistan strengthened their 
commitments to one another and expanded cooperation between the CIA and ISI.  Ronald 
Reagan’s election to office in 1980 brought a $3.2 billion aid package to Pakistan that 
persuaded Zia’s cooperation.  The U.S. provided military assistance to Pakistan with the 
purpose of supporting guerilla warfare in Afghanistan.35  These fighters, the Mujahideen, 
were U.S.- and Saudi- sponsored Sunni graduates of Pakistani madrassahs.36   
C. POST-AFGHANISTAN WAR 1988-1994 
What impact did the divergence of interests have in the post-Afghanistan War 
period?  The Soviets could not continue to sustain heavy losses in what had initially only 
been less than a battalion of troops.  The Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan in 1988 
with the last troops leaving in February 1989 after investing nine years and 15,000 dead.  
Zia never saw a government friendly to Pakistan installed in Afghanistan.  He died in a 
suspicious airplane crash in August of 1988.  In fact, Pakistan did not acquire a friendly 
government in Afghanistan and the United States did not remove communism from 
Afghanistan.  Even as the Soviets departed, they continued supplying the communist 
Najibullah regime.  The Bush administration wanted out of Afghanistan but conservatives 
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in Congress continued to funnel funds to the ISI in an effort to use the Mujahideen to 
support the Afghan Interim Government (AIG).  The Bush administration wanted to use 
the funds to rebuild Afghanistan’s economy.  If the Mujahideen could take Jalalabad, 
then it would prove AIG’s viability as the government in Afghanistan and thus gain 
international recognition.  This ISI plan also met resistance from Pakistan’s newly elected 
government under Benazir Bhutto, but she could not exert pressure over the ISI or any 
other part of the military.37  Mujahideen forces failed to take Jalalabad due to infighting 
and a lack of coordination resulting in dwindling U.S. support after 1989.  Pakistan’s 
military continued to dominate its foreign policy making.38    
Having contained Soviet expansionism, even if communism continued in 
Afghanistan, the United States achieved its interests with the help of Pakistan’s military.  
Pakistan, however, suffered from the effects of a war in a neighboring country, a failing 
economy based on black market trade, and a failed foreign policy determined by its 
military.  The United States left Pakistan to bear the brunt of the war’s aftermath and in 
search of a new foreign policy.  The divergence in interests led to a divergence in visions 
of an end-state, which, in turn, led to the aftermath discussed below. 
D. RISE OF THE TALIBAN AND SUPPORT OF JIHADIS 1994-2001 
The communist regime could not bring order and Afghanistan decayed into civil 
strife torn between tribal factions and along ethnic divisions.  The Taliban rose as a grass 
roots based organization, Pashtun in ethnicity, and espousing only a loosely formed 
ideology of justice based on the Qur’an.  Western minds associate the Taliban with an 
appallingly brutish human rights reputation and images of a lawless gang cum terrorist 
organization.  Yet in 1994, the United States briefly welcomed the Taliban as an 
organization that could end the civil strife in Afghanistan and establish a modicum of 
stability.  Quickly realizing its mistake, however, the United States hastily retracted its 
positive acknowledgements.  Pakistan, nonetheless, proceeded to develop its relationship 
with the Taliban.  This relationship, and its pursuant goals in Afghanistan, discussed 
below, became known as Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy.  To understand the nature of 
Pakistan’s decision, it is necessary to recognize what the Taliban represents.   
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Millions of Afghan refugees have swamped Pakistan’s borders since the 
Afghanistan War in the 1980’s.  By the end of 2002, Pakistan hosted 2.2 million Afghan 
refugees39 creating a severe problem for Pakistan over the past 25 years.  These Pashtun 
refugees brought their tribal traditions and laws as well as their rivalries against Tajik and 
Uzbek tribes.  Afghan Pashtuns ethnically shared much in common with their Pakistani 
Pashtun neighbors. The main difference differentiating them became which side of the 
Afghan-Pakistan border they lived in when Pakistan was created in 1947.   
Too poor to afford private schools and no access to Pakistan’s few public schools, 
many of these refugees sent their sons to madrassahs in Pakistan where they received 
training, seminarian in character, geared towards a fundamentalist Islam rather than a 
general education beneficial to society.  Religious extremism, for the purposes of this 
paper, means an unembellished and literal interpretation of the Qur’an disallowing 
interpretive conclusions drawn from a liberal, modern societal context.  Religious 
extremism in madrassahs stemmed from the financial support of Saudi Arabia and thus, 
the importation of its strict Wahhabi form of Islam.   
The purpose and end product of these madrassahs was the development of 
militants capable of fighting a godless foreign occupier (the Soviets) in Afghanistan.  
Once the Afghanistan War ended in 1988, the madrassahs continued to produce Islamic 
religious militants despite the elimination of a requirement for fighters.  Brought up in a 
lifestyle of sparse conditions, devoid of female interaction, and bereft of broader 
education, these students did not receive the conceptual or philosophical balance that a 
broad perspective provides.  Instead, the focus centered on an Islamist ideology 
predisposed towards quick judgments coupled with harsh punishment in an environment 
that no longer provided an outlet for their tensions.  The Taliban emerged in 1994 from 
this group.  What does the Taliban provide to Pakistan in order to become an accepted 
political tool for Pakistan’s interests?   
The Taliban offered domestic and foreign policy solutions to Pakistan by fighting 
Pakistan’s ‘Fourth War’.  First, the Taliban offered madrassah graduates an opportunity 
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to be productive in a society in which they were otherwise ill equipped to compete for a 
livelihood.  This same job placement opportunity also offered a ‘religious’ placement 
opportunity in the sense that students can play a role in actively advancing their 
fundamentalist/extremist Islamic values.  Thus, envision the Taliban as a tool for Pakistan 
to export this fundamentalist/extremist element rather than suffer its negative effects 
within Pakistan’s borders.40 
Second, the Taliban provides Pakistan with a method of gaining influence in 
Afghanistan.  Pakistan fears a strong and hostile Afghanistan because that would imply 
having to defend both its eastern and western borders against hostile countries.  Instead, 
Pakistan intends to emplace and support a government that, if not controlled by Pakistan, 
at least will be pro-Pakistani.  The civil strife occurring between 1988 and 1994 resulted 
from ethnic fighting between Uzbek, Tajik, Pashtun and other tribes for control of tribal 
Afghanistan as well as from intra-tribal fighting.  The Pashtun ethnic background of the 
Taliban offered Pakistan a more controllable, if not reliable, partner in fighting against 
non-Pashtun tribes.   
Third, a deeper reason exists for tribal contests than simple historic claims to land.  
Pakistan’s politicians and military leadership utilized the Taliban as a proxy army in 
defending Pakistan against foreign influence and aggression.  This point illustrates 
Pakistan’s fear of external actors attempting to undermine its ethnic and religious 
divisions through subversion.  Afghanistan’s value to Pakistan is that of a buffer country 
in which a reticent war was fought between Pakistan and India.  The Taliban’s value lay 
in its determination, motivated by ethnic and religious roots, to defend Afghanistan.  
India adds another layer to the rival tribes’ efforts to control Afghanistan by supporting 
ethnic Uzbek and Tajik tribes against the Pashtuns.41  India’s goal is to prevent the 
Pashtuns from gaining control of Afghanistan and to preclude a Pakistani friendly regime 
in Afghanistan.   
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Iran and Saudi Arabia also utilize religious sectarian violence to fight for strategic 
and political dominance in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Baxter and Kennedy write that, “It 
is obvious that in the mosques, madrassahs, and streets of Pakistan both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia are engaged in a proxy war for religio-political influence and clout in Pakistan, 
[and] Afghanistan…” in what they call a “fourth India-Pakistan War”.42  This thesis 
refers to this furtive conflict as Pakistan’s Fourth War.  Pakistan’s sponsorship of the 
Taliban, with its avowedly violent anti-Shi’a stance. further underlines the Pakistani-
Iranian divide.  Iran sees itself as the advocate for Shi’a Muslims and has a special 
affinity for Shi’a Muslims in a country with which it shares a common border.  Pakistan’s 
Taliban ‘solution’ resulted in spurring sectarian violence rather than defeating it.43 
Russian Federation (Russian) interests in Afghanistan in 1996 stemmed from a 
fear that the Taliban’s religious puritanicalism would spread to Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.  Russia, therefore, supported the ousted Rabbani government to undermine 
the Taliban and to prevent it from establishing political control of Afghanistan.  Russia 
also curtailed military sales to Pakistan due to the latter’s support of the Taliban.44 
Finally, Pakistan could not afford to alienate jihadi groups, including the Taliban, 
because Pakistan needed them to control the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, to keep the 
Kashmir issue alive, and because Pakistan’s government could not govern in areas with a 
strong separatist sentiment.45  Pakistan’s military cannot seal the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border stretching 1,515 miles.  Adding further to this impossible task is Pakistan’s fear of 
a hostile India.  Pakistan reluctantly places military troops on its western border while 
deeming the requirement more necessary on its Indian border.  It viewed the Taliban as a 
rear guard militia protecting its interests in Afghanistan.   
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Internally, Pakistan did not possess a strong enough military to suppress a 
secessionist uprising by Pashtuns in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) or by the 
Balochis in Balochistan, and therefore, could not risk using strong-arm tactics to govern 
these separatist inclined areas.  Pakistan staked its territorial sovereignty on a policy of 
engaging the Taliban and other jihadis in a positive manner.  Nurturing close ties with the 
Taliban provided an avenue of government by consent rather than force. 
Consequently, Pakistan relied heavily on the Taliban to provide an outlet for 
religious militants, to gain influence in Afghanistan, to defend Pakistan from external 
aggressors in Afghanistan, especially in its Fourth War with India, to better control the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and to help preclude territorial loss to active separatist 
movements.  The Taliban provided this mostly unrecognized support in a manner that is 
effective, militarily efficient, and politically sound, yet, to some extent, deniable.   
Throughout the 1990’s, Pakistan’s military worked closely with the Taliban 
fighting against the Indian supported Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan and against 
Indian forces in Kashmir.  Time served together fighting alongside one another bound 
Pakistani officers and soldiers closely to their Taliban comrades.  This bond deepened as 
time progressed to the point that Taliban fighters expected Pakistani troops to remain 
with the Taliban despite the Pakistani soldier’s reassignment.46 
If the Taliban became more of a liability than an asset to Pakistan’s domestic 
issues, then it becomes reasonable to assume that the military institution’s continued 
support of the Taliban rested on external fears.  These fears become reasonable in the 
context of Pakistan’s military strategy.  Pakistan needed an ally to defeat Indian 
influences in Afghanistan.  Despite Pakistan remaining a loyal supporter of U.S. interests 
in South Asia, the United States did not always support Pakistan when requested.  U.S. 
support failed to materialize during the 1965 War with India and during the 1971 War 
when Pakistan lost its eastern state, which became Bangladesh.  Having established a 
history of not supporting Pakistan during war, it fits then that Pakistan will first act to  
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protect itself against external enemies even at the expense of internal strife, further 
evidenced more recently during the United States’ global war on terrorism in 
Afghanistan.47 
E. MILITARY’S INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC POLITICS 
What impact did Pakistan’s military regime have on Pakistan’s foreign policy and 
domestic politics and how did this affect U.S. interests?  Pakistan’s troubled democracy 
fell to General Zia’s coup resulting in the military’s total hold on Pakistan.  Zia used the 
Jama’at-I-Islami (JI) as a cover to hide his military regime under the pretext of bringing 
about an Islamic state.  He also borrowed heavily from the JI’s vision on several policies.  
For example, Zia’s continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability resulted in the loss 
of an annual $50 million in aid under the Glenn Act, previously waived under President 
Nixon while Z. A. Bhutto attempted democracy.  The JI supported the pursuit of a 
nuclear weapons program, although it feared the financial impact, as part of its vision to 
“develop Pakistan[‘s] defence potentials to the maximum, using all appropriate modes 
including [a] nuclear option.”48  Zia’s Islamization program spurred a plethora of Islamic 
parties that split the JI’s bid for the moderate Islamist vote, thereby giving rise to 
disparate groups prone to violent actions.49  Thus, Zia’s institution of policies, under the 
Islamic pretext, began to affect Pakistani lives. 
Zia’s announcement in August 1983 of the lifting of martial law in 1985 resulted 
in general, but not presidential, elections in February 1985 and the investiture of 
Mohammed Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister (PM).  This façade of a democratic 
government, with Zia making the laws, did not deceive Pakistanis.  In May 1988, Zia 
dismissed the Junejo government, dissolved national and provincial assemblies, and 
ordered a new election in 90 days.  Zia died, however, before the holding of elections.50  
Constitutionally based elections occurred in November 1988 resulting in Benazir  
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Bhutto’s inaugural ceremony as PM in December.  Zia’s Islamization left a vicious 
legacy of sectarian militancy resented by many Pakistanis and left the JI with fewer 
members due to its association with Zia. 
In 1993, Pakistan’s army intervened in domestic politics but not via a coup.  
Instead, it negotiated a deal, in which Sharif resigned along with President Ishaq Khan to 
end the bitter power struggle that stagnated Pakistan’s civilian governance.  Elections 
were held again and Benazir Bhutto regained her position as PM in October 1993.   
Upon Sharif’s election in 1997, he embarked on preventing a military coup by 
appointing General Pervez Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff and intimidating the 
press.51  The Kargil conflict in 1999 in which Pakistan launched an attack near the 
Siachen glacier in Kashmir, resulted from a military decision by General Musharraf 
rather than from an order from PM Nawaz Sharif.  Launched primarily to gain political 
leverage by making Indian positions further down the Line of Control (LOC) untenable, 
the operation failed to produce the military’s desired strategic benefits.  The subsequent 
military defeat isolated Sharif’s government on the international level, aggravated U.S. 
relations, and destroyed Pakistani confidence in Sharif’s government.52  Further 
exasperating his worries, Pakistan’s political system became consumed by political 
fragmentation and corruption while the country suffered from continued sectarian 
violence, ethnic separatist issues, and organized crime.  Fearing a coup, Sharif attempted 
to dismiss Musharraf but failed, and in October 1999, Musharraf ousted Sharif.  “The 
violence has also complicated democratic consolidation…it forced the civilian 
government to look to the military…to restore order, and paved the way for the coup of 
1999.”53  Musharraf intended for his military intervention to stabilize the nation long 
enough to rehabilitate a stagnated economy and to revive a viable democratic system. 
1. Foreign Policy as a Result of Domestic Politics 
Pakistan’s foreign policy results not only from external threats but also because of 
domestic politics.  General Zia’s decision to change Pakistan’s defensive policy towards 
Afghanistan to an offensive strategy, his response to the non-submissive communist 
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government, derived from his domestic policy of Islamization.  His Islamization policy 
intensified the religious sectarian schisms.  These schisms acted as a domestic political 
springboard to justify military intervention in Afghanistan in the name of national 
security and framed in a religious context.  No other head of Pakistan’s military has been 
as successful in manipulating domestic politics as General Zia.  Even Musharraf, the only 
military authoritarian since Zia, oriented on a secular government based on moderate 
governance rather than divisive exploitation.   
Second, Zia based part of his decision to assist the United States in the 
Afghanistan War on a desire to gain U.S. support of his regime to bolster his legitimacy 
in domestic politics, thus preventing his regime’s demise due to an unpopular domestic 
policy.   
Beyond Zia’s death, Pakistan’s military institution continued to generate foreign 
policy from domestic politics.  In 1994, Benazir Bhutto first made plans to utilize the 
Taliban as the basis of her (civilian) government’s bid to gain political advantage and to 
develop an Afghanistan policy for Pakistan.  The ISI quickly caught onto this scheme and 
firmly wrested foreign policy making back into military hands.   
Despite which regime is in power, Pakistan’s military institution determines 
regional and foreign policy.  Pakistan’s military institution is an apolitical entity that 
determines what it believes is in the best interests of national security and acts 
accordingly.  Pakistan’s strong military is not beholden to its civilian master, and as such, 
it embodies a military-state relationship uncharacteristic of a democracy.  Pakistan’s 
military is political in the sense that it pursues its own policies that a civilian regime may 
or may not support, and may or may not even be in the best interests of Pakistan.  
Pakistan’s military institution acts in its own interests, which normally improves the 
state’s security interests, often detracting from the overall welfare of Pakistan.  Reducing 
the defense budget is situation even Benazir Bhutto would not consider, even though she 
believed the money better spent in other areas.54   
Civilian rule witnessed one of its longer stretches of governance after Zia’s death.  
Yet corruption, political fractionalization rather than coalition, and regime preservation 
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rather than nation building characterized civilian governance.  Beneath this type of 
civilian governance, military decision-making accounted for matters of national security 
and foreign policy.  The brief occasion in which the civilian government attempted to 
assert dominance over the army did not receive public support, but rather the opposite 
held true. Pakistanis almost welcomed the promise of stability that the army provided 
despite its military failure in 1999.  This trend in Pakistani politics for the PM to seek 
relatively weak personages to place in positions that could end their regime as president 
or Army Chief of Staff, usually backfires.  If a PM truly represented Pakistani citizens, 
then the citizenry would support the PM’s government and resulting in a reduced 
likelihood of a military coup since historically, the military only intervenes to prevent a 
complete collapse of a failed civilian regime.   
F. DEGREE OF MILITARY’S INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC POLICY 
1. General Zia ul-Haq Liberalizes the Economy 
General Zia ul-Haq annulled Z.A. Bhutto’s nationalism and re-empowered the 
Planning Commission, thus liberalizing the economy.  Pakistani economists formulated 
the economic policy.  To meet the rising deficit incurred by defense and public 
administration costs, Zia’s regime borrowed against domestic non-bank savings avoiding 
problems associated with leveraging monetary tools and exacerbating its foreign debt.  
This tended to keep interests rates high curbing domestic investment while encouraging 
savings.  Policy responses offered various incentives (e.g., tax breaks and rebates) to 
encourage domestic investment.  Capitalizing on Z.A. Bhutto’s promotion of small 
businesses, these incentives for domestic investment resulted in diversifying Pakistan’s 
economy.  The Afghanistan war meant an annual $2 billion infusion of foreign aid. 
Regrettably, Pakistan could not tax what amounted to between 20-30 percent (about $1.5 
billion) of its GNP, invested in an illegal black market trade at a time when fiscal deficits 
reached eight percent.55 
Protectionist measures for industry re-ignited and resulted in short-run 
investments that produced growth but did not include investment in human capital 
(training and education) or technological innovations, neither which would have 
increased long-term efficiencies.  Pakistan improved its agricultural sector, where it held 
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a comparative advantage, but did not give it preference over industrialization, thereby 
failing to leverage its comparative advantage.  Worse yet, within agricultural sub-sectors, 
where Pakistan enjoyed a comparative advantage in wheat, it concentrated on improving 
its cotton sector.  Zia’s policies resulted in over a 6 percent GNP growth rate (agriculture 
managed four percent growth while manufacturing climbed to 8.8 percent) while inflation 
held at 7.6 percent.  Pakistani remittances assisted greatly amounting to $3 billion 
annually by the end of this period.  Poverty dropped to 30 percent.56  Pakistan’s economy 
thrived on its ability to continue receiving U.S. and other international funding.  Despite 
the growth that his policies brought, he failed to institute the long-term policies that could 
sustain Pakistan’s economy beyond his regime.   
2. Musharraf’s Macroeconomic Stability 
General Musharraf began a strategy to provide macroeconomic stability to 
counteract the drift in the economic policies of the 1990’s resulting from the tumultuous 
turnover of civilian governments.  Looney identifies four goals of Musharraf’s strategy.  
First, Musharraf undertook the re-establishment of relations with international lenders 
estranged in the 1990’s by Pakistan’s poor economic performance and defaulting 
payments.  These efforts enabled Musharraf’s regime to achieve short-medium run 
stopgap measures to stabilize the economy while buying time to implement long-term 
solutions.  Second, he aimed at structural reforms to remove distortions in the economy.  
Distortions such as the overvaluation of the rupee and disparate interest rates made any 
further policy changes problematic.  Third, he intended to improve economic policy 
formulation.  This could be done through building better relationships between 
government institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Finance), the programs implementing 
government policies, and by providing feedback through ongoing analysis by an 
independent auditor, much like that of grant stipulations.  This audit role would play well 
into assisting his fourth goal.  Finally, Musharraf intends to address social concerns as 
part of his macroeconomic stabilization strategy focused on reducing poverty.57   
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Pakistan continues to receive aid in the form of direct aid, easements on loans and 
new loans from the IMF at the behest of the United States.  Musharraf’s regime benefits 
from U.S. support that will likely continue as long as he can implement the policies and 
programs t he initiated.58    
Pakistan’s economy went through periods of non-policy formulation, heavily 
influenced liberalism, centralized socialism, liberalism with analyzed policies, quasi-
implemented liberalization, and is currently undergoing its strongest push yet for a free-
market economy.  Pakistan’s economy either suffered from poor policies or from good 
policies implemented poorly.  Pakistan’s economic future lies with the leadership, 
civilian or military, that can deliver good policy and insure its implementation.  Should 
the U.S. continue to support Pakistan’s military authoritarian regime based on an 
economic imperative?  Good policies are in place and need only stability to implement 
them.  Musharraf is in the best position, now and in the near term, to deliver both stability 
and implementation.  In a purely economic sense, support for Musharraf is desirable so 
that the rapid regime turnovers of the 1990’s that formed a barrier to implementation do 
not continue into the new millennium.  A return to civilian authority too early could 
undermine the stability his regime brings. 
G. CONCLUSION 
U.S. relations with Pakistan saw its lowest point when Zia overthrew civilian 
governance and instituted his Islamization program.  U.S. support of Zia’s military 
regime declined until Soviet military action in Afghanistan abruptly refocused U.S. 
attention.  It is likely U.S. relations may have tapered off completely under Zia given 
India’s democracy was back on track and relations with China were increasingly warm.  
Zia’s Islamization left a vicious legacy of sectarian militancy.   
The Iranian Revolution in December of 1979 and the Afghan war during the 
1980's deeply impacted U.S.-Pakistani relations and set the stage for today’s continuing 
domestic and international political issues.  As the United States and Pakistan joined 
efforts to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan, they sought different goals, which led to 
different visions of how the Afghanistan War should end.  The United States wanted to 
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leave while maintaining support for Pakistan’s effort to expel the communist government 
remaining in Afghanistan.  Pakistan meanwhile meant to keep a hand in Afghanistan by 
emplacing a government agreeable to Pakistan.  These divergent views allowed 
conditions to develop in Afghanistan leading to unintended consequences more than a 
decade later. The Afghanistan war brought the widespread sale of arms and drugs to 
Pakistan giving rise to lucrative criminal activities and a violent capability to sectarian 
militants.   
Pakistan’s military institution continued to maintain development and 
implementation of Pakistan’s foreign policy during periods of both military and civilian 
governance.  Even if no coup results, Pakistan’s military institution jealously protects 
foreign policy making by engaging in domestic politics.  Pakistan’s military engages in 
its domestic politics typically to provide a decisive role during a crisis in civilian 
governance.  This role may be a simple intervention to arbitrate disputes between civilian 
political parties or it may take the form of a military coup to establish security and/or 
stability.   
Pakistan’s military either directly controlled Pakistan’s economy during periods 
of military rule or had an impact on the economy during civilian governance in the form 
of the defense budget.  Zia’s economic reforms achieved great rates of success during his 
regime’s era.  However, his reliance on funding from the United States clouded his ability 
to create a long-term economic plan.  Musharraf’s plan may continue to work provided 
he is capable of implanting each of the goals he identified.  The ability of the Pakistan’s 
military governance to provide a healthy and recovering economy impacts the conditions 
that contribute to the making of a successful state or a failed state, and thereby, the 
possible requirement for U.S. intervention to protect its interests in the region. 
Pakistan’s military assisted the United States in reaching its national interest in 
containing Soviet expansionism for almost a decade.  Prior, it provided the Carter 
administration an intelligence gathering capability that the United States otherwise could 
not have gained in the region.  Pakistan’s military decided on two courses of action, the 
use of the Taliban during the 1990’s and the Kargil gambit in 1999, that railed against 
U.S. desires but did not immediately counter U.S. NSS interests.  However, the  
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unintended consequences of the Pakistani military institution’s partnership with the 
Taliban seriously jeopardized Pakistan’s relationship with the United States.  Musharraf’s 
cooperation since 9/11 came at a high price. 
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IV. PAKISTAN’S MILITARY INSTITUTION 
It is first necessary to outline Pakistan’s military institution before a discussion 
can begin pertaining to Pakistan’s capacity for military assistance to the United States.  
Military and civilian members of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) customarily 
speak about the American military infrastructure to include its “Total Force” concept 
(military, civilian, and contractor personnel), joint warfighting prescription (1986 
Nichols-Goldwater Act), and links to industry vendors.  The post 9/11 environment 
expands this meaning to include the integration of various executive branch agencies.  
The American concept of the military infrastructure does not form a parallel explanation 
for Pakistan’s military institution.   
As an institution, Pakistan’s military is literally the government whether it acts by 
influencing civil governments or by acting as an authoritarian regime.  Devoid of 
decision by democratic consensus, it is inherently more aptly suited to finding military 
solutions rather than diplomatic solutions.  Military solutions are appropriate to 
continuing politics by force, if necessary, but rarely support a solid long-term strategy.  
The shifting of troops demonstrated above shows the strategic shortfall of this 
arrangement.  Other significant differences also affect Pakistan’s military institution. 
What is the nature of complexity that constitutes Pakistan’s military?  The term 
‘military institution’ refers to the incorporation of, and not simply the integration of, the 
four functional portions of Pakistan’s military complex.  The four functions include the 
Ministry of Defense, all intelligence assets (under the ISI), all military forces comprising 
the three service branches and the Missile and Nuclear Programs, and the military 
industrial complex.  The military directs control over each of these four functional areas.  
Identification of Pakistan’s military infrastructure is required to determine what roles it 
can and cannot complete.   
A. COMPONENTS OF PAKISTAN’S MILITARY INSTITUTION 
1. The Ministry of Defense 
The Ministry of Defense is the overall umbrella of Pakistan’s military institution.  
Although a civilian chairs the Defense Council and is a member of the higher-level 
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Cabinet Defense Committee, this position is more of a liaison between the government 
and the military rather than a position of instrumental power.  Probably the most 
powerful civilian in the Ministry of Defense is the Adviser for Military Finance.  This 
individual functions in a dual role acting both as the head of the Military Finance 
Division in the (civilian) Ministry of Finance and as the Defense Ministry’s principal 
financial officer.  The Pakistani military differs from other national militaries in that it 
dictates, as Benazir Bhutto once lamented, the military budget despite civilian 
control.59The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee plays an advisory role by integrating and 
coordinating the three services and planning national military strategy.  The Chairman 
fills a somewhat impotent position whose only avenue to substantial power lays in 
function of serving as the president’s main staff officer in war.60  This may help to 
explain Musharraf’s posting of Islamist General Aziz as Chairman in 2001.   
2. Inter Services Intelligence 
In American terms, a possible understanding of the ISI is somewhat analogous to 
a combination of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) all under one hat controlled by the 
military.  Even during years of civilian democracy in the 1990s, ISI ownership continued 
to be completely within the realms of the military and thus provided the military the 
ability to challenge civilian rule using domestic intelligence gathering capabilities.  
The ISI began as consolidation of each military branch’s intelligence agency but 
then evolved by assuming Pakistan’s national and domestic intelligence functions under 
Zulfiqar Bhutto.  Z. A. Bhutto’s interest in expanding the roles of ISI lay in his desire to 
spy on his political opponents and to gain a better insight into international threats.  This 
trend continued under themilitary authoritarian General Zia-ul-Haq who used it to spy on 
Z. A. Bhutto’s political party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).  Zia expanded the scope 
of the ISI by placing it in charge of organizing Mujahideen fighters and distributing funds 
in the anti-Soviet guerilla war in Afghanistan.  In this new funding role, the ISI quickly 
became involved in disrupting fair political practices by buying off political parties and 
                                                 
59 Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, 237. 
60 GlobalSecurity.org Internet Website “Pakistan Military Guide” Available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/ December 2003. 
45
other groups with government funds.  Most surprising, however, may be that the ISI 
considered this a legitimate practice.  Finally, the ISI hijacked the Taliban, as a political 
force, from Benazir Bhutto when it learned of her desire to affect Pakistan’s foreign 
policy in Afghanistan.  The ISI quickly caught on and began funding the Taliban, more 
than Bhutto could sustain, and thereby, gaining the Taliban’s loyalty.  B. Bhutto had 
sourced funding from government budgets to pay the Taliban.  Under Zia, the ISI came 
fully under military control where it remains today.61 
With a staff of approximately 10,000 civilians, military officers, and others, 
today’s ISI concerns itself with several issues such as the collection of foreign and 
domestic intelligence and coordinating the intelligence functions of the three military 
services.  It also provides close scrutiny over its own ranks and surveillance of foreigners 
(including foreign diplomats), the media, politically active dissidents (within Pakistani 
society), and of Pakistanis (diplomats and civilians) outside of Pakistan.  Key to assisting 
U.S. interests in the region, ISI also coordinates and conducts covert offensive 
operations.62   
3. Military Forces: Army 
The Pakistani Army represents the chief power in Pakistan.  The military staged 
three coups in 52 years and has been in power for more than 28 years out of Pakistan’s 
56-year existence.  Stabilizing the country, however, is not the purpose of Pakistan’s 
army.  Pakistan immediately went to war upon its creation and has since always harbored 
a fear of Indian invasion in addition to internal fracturing at the hands of separatists, as 
happened in Bangladesh in 1971.  These two primary national security fears have driven 
Pakistan to emphasize the need for a strong and capable army.  This basis also denotes 
Pakistan’s military focus, which will have to undergo revision if it is to be providing 
continued and improved assistance to U.S. goals. 
Standing at 520,000 strong, Pakistan’s Army receives the lion’s share of 
Pakistan’s military defense budget (4.6 percent GDP in FY01).63  Nine corps comprise 
the Pakistani Army as well as a command element in Gilgit (Kashmir).  What does this 
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mean to Pakistan’s ability to support U.S. interests?  The challenge of maintaining 
Pakistan’s 1,515 mile-long western border quickly becomes apparent when competing 
with Pakistan’s national geo-strategic interests.  Simply put, Pakistan’s army is not large 
enough to prevent infiltration of its borders, let alone deter India, suppress separatist 
movements, and provide forces for international, UN sponsored operations.  How can this 
be resolved?  One method is that Pakistan’s army is least capable of fulfilling is to 
provide diplomatic and democratic solutions that alleviate the need for a continued 
military solution.  What Pakistan’s army can offer, however, is substantial in terms of 
placing units in key areas to monitor crucial border locations, assisting U.S. forces in 
engagements either conjointly or as Pakistani-only actions, and in providing logistical 
support areas supporting U.S. forces.  With only 9,000-11,000 U.S. troops operating in 
Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), assistance from Pakistan’s army 
becomes essential in engaging al-Qaeda.  
4. Military Forces: Pakistani Air Force (PAF) 
Pakistan’s Air Force (PAF) places emphasis on supporting the army with more 
than 50 percent of its aircraft designated for ground support.  Significantly smaller, the 
PAF numbers only about 45,000 personnel and approximately 650 aircraft.64More 
importantly is the capability that the PAF can bring to assisting U.S. interests in the form 
of securing Pakistan’s western border and providing infrastructure support for U.S. forces 
operating from Pakistan.  Pakistan already has 20 airfields capable of supporting jet 
fighters and has another ten that it is possible to improve quickly.  Pakistan’s pilots offer 
something else most other countries cannot provide. It possesses firsthand experience in 
dropping smart munitions at high altitudes in support of ground troops.65 
How much of an impact did the PAF and its infrastructures mean to U.S. 
interests?   
In a sign of the increasingly close security ties between the United States 
and Pakistan, President Gen Pervez Musharraf, has accepted a US request 
for a long-term presence at Jacobabad air base.  [Also] US officials have 
requested 40,000 metric tons of concrete to renovate the base in 
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Jacobabad…that a wall surrounding the base be raised four feet, and… to 
construct air-conditioned barracks for US troops.  [Adding that] [i]n the 
foreseeable future, Jacobabad air base would continue to serve as a key 
facility for the US military's peacekeeping or counter terrorism operation 
in Afghanistan…[Finally,] US officials have asked that all but a few 
Pakistani liaison officers be withdrawn from the base.66  
Not only is the PAF assisting the United States directly in this instance, it vacated 
one of its air bases for the United States’ sole use.   
5. Military Forces: Navy 
The least regarded of Pakistan’s military services, the Navy, boasts an end-
strength of only about 22,000 personnel, approximately 34 sea-going vessels, and 25 
aircraft, of which 12 are operated by the PAF.67  A recent breakthrough for Pakistan’s 
Navy and for the country, has been the completion of its first domestically produced 
submarine, the new Agosta 90-B.  While this submarine may give “a considerable boost 
to [Pakistan’s] defense capability”68, it does not provide much direct use to U.S. interests.  
Indirectly, however, it is possible to use the funding of a portion of the submarine 
building program as a bargaining lever to gain additional Pakistani support.  Engineering 
and building is completed in conjunction with France. 
Pakistan’s naval air power focuses on searching for Indian naval vessels and 
benefits from aircraft with long loiter times.  If Pakistan’s fears of an Indian naval threat 
could be subdued, then these aircraft could be freed up to provide more border as well as 
maritime (drug smuggling) surveillance.   
Of note is Pakistan’s two other sea-going organizations, the Pakistan Coast Guard 
and the Maritime Security Agency (MSA) working in conjunction with the Coast Guard.  
Pakistan created the MSA in 1994 to assist the Coast Guard response to civil needs and 
criminal activities.  While not part of the military, its para-military organization and 
capabilities offers substantial benefits against the criminal activities (drug and weapons 
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smuggling) that provide financial and arms support to terrorist organizations.69  Part of 
the FY02 $2.5 million that the United States funded to Pakistan through the International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) fund went “to improve Pakistan Coast Guard 
and Maritime Security Agency capacity.”70 
6. Military Forces: Missile Program 
Pakistan’s missile program includes smaller air-to-air missiles as well as much 
larger ground-to-ground systems, most notably in the form of the Ghauri and Shaheen 
missiles.  These missile systems contribute to the national defense of Pakistan against 
conventional national forces but are of little use in assisting U.S. interests in the GWOT.   
7. Military Forces: Nuclear Program 
Much in the same light as Pakistan’s Missile Program, the Nuclear Program does 
not offer solutions to the GWOT.  Conversely, Pakistan’s Nuclear Program proved 
favorable to Pakistani interests when President Bush lifted sanctions against this program 
in order to obtain Pakistani support in the GWOT.  This program is almost entirely 
military in nature and, except for jobs and the argument that it provides national defense, 
does not provide a direct civilian benefit in the form of power production or development 
of the medical industry. 
8. Pakistan’s Military Industrial Complex 
An important function of Pakistan’s military institution is its military industrial 
complex as a completely integrated system of domestic production capabilities.  Not 
simply a favored group of contractors, Pakistan owns this complex of plants and factories 
and  receives its direction from the military.   
The Pakistani Aeronautical Complex (PAC) hosts the Mirage/F-6 Rebuild 
Factory; the Mushshak/Super Mushshak (trainer aircraft) and Karakoram-8 (jet trainer) 
Manufacturing Factory; the Baaz and Ababeel Aerial Target System Manufacturing 
plant; and the Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory.   
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The Heavy Industry Taxila (HIT) employs about 6,500 workers, including about 
2,000 military personnel, and produces and rebuilds the Al-Khalid main battle tank 
(MBT), the Al-Zarar MBT, the T-85IIAP MBT, and the Talha armored personnel 
carrier.71   
This potion of Pakistan’s military institution does not play a direct role in 
assisting U.S. interests, but indirectly produces aircraft, especially the Baaz and Ababeel, 
which can be outfitted as reconnaissance platforms that are suitable for patrolling the 
border and providing surveillance.   
Pakistan’s military has much to offer the United States in its endeavor to pursue 
the GWOT in Afghanistan.  Most significantly though, Pakistan as a ‘frontline’ state, 
allows the United States a forward position with which to conduct OEF and Pakistan’s 
military is the vehicle through which that support arrives. 
B. MILITARY’S POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC & FOREIGN 
POLICY 
It is not possible to understand Pakistan’s military influence in Pakistani politics 
fully without placing it into context.  The Constitution of the United States of America is 
the singular national institution that unifies Americans.  In Pakistan, the singular national 
institution that unifies Pakistanis is Pakistan’s military.  Despite its Punjabi ethnic make-
up, it is the one national institution in Pakistan that engenders nationalistic patriotism.  
Only during Ayub Khan’s Islamization program has Pakistan’s military broken this 
image and has since regained its former status.  The reason for Pakistanis’ unity around 
this particular national institution is the fear of Pakistan’s decimation at the hands of 
India.   
India’s efforts immediately after independence to undo Pakistan…were 
the main causes for the bitterness and sense of insecurity which gripped 
the Pakistani policy-makers from the very outset.  This perception was to 
have a profound influence on the formulation of their defence and foreign 
policies.  In the years that followed, the Pakistani policy-makers remained 
convinced that India…was conspiring against Pakistan’s very 
independence and territorial integrity72 
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Since that time, civilian leadership regarded the military as Pakistan’s savior 
against foreign threats.  This helps to explain the military’s latter involvement in foreign 
policy making, first in relation to security and then more broadly over all foreign policy.   
Beyond physical constraints and limitations on the roles Pakistan’s military can 
conceivably accomplish, Pakistan’s capacity to provide assistance must also take into 
account political, ethnic and religious considerations.  
1. Military Influence 
Military influence in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policymaking revolves 
around its history of providing a ‘safety valve’ that establishes stability in Pakistan’s 
society when tumultuous civilian governments fail.  General Ayub Khan (who later 
abdicated to Yahya Khan) responded to Iskander Mirza’s failed government.  General 
Zia-ul-Haq replaced Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s corrupt, authoritarian rather than democratic, 
civilian government when it collapsed.  General Pervez Musharraf took control of the 
government in 1999 when the feuding between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif resulted 
in the turnover of their governments in 1990, 1993, and 1997.  Their corruption and 
political infighting threatened the stability of Pakistan as a contiguous whole.  Each of the 
four military authoritarians has significantly impacted both domestic and foreign policy 
issues while acting as the head of state. 
The other aspect of the military’s influence descends directly from the assertion of 
military supremacy in the government.  This history of the military’s willingness to take 
control of the government transformed Pakistan’s military as a public servant into a 
‘political force’ of its own.  As a political force, Pakistan’s civilian governments have 
given the military leeway to make foreign policy.  In the same manner, the military’s 
political force determines, to some degree, domestic policy by dictating its budget to the 
government.   
2. Foreign Policy 
Even before Ayub Khan led the military’s first coup against the civilian 
government, his influence persuaded civilian leaders to join the U.S. sponsored Baghdad 
Pact as he “was particularly keen to secure the latest American military equipment for the 
Pakistani armed forces”73.  After his coup, he continued to reach out to develop stronger 
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relations with the United States despite President John F. Kennedy’s disinterest in 
Pakistan.  By 1963, Ayub Khan began shifting towards Soviet agreements establishing 
trade, air services, and oil exploration agreements in the vacuum left by Kennedy.  Ayub 
Khan’s misjudgment of Indian intentions, of Pakistan’s abilities, and of American 
support, witnessed the unplanned war of 1965 that Pakistan ultimately lost.  This foreign 
policy failure became a turning point in his increasingly unpopular rule and would cause 
further foreign policy problems.  By 1969, Ayub Khan’s unpopularity caused the Soviets 
to reassess their alignment with Pakistan and instead support India.74   
Yahya Khan’s disenfranchisement of Bengalis in the 1971 elections, discussed 
below, also had international implications due to poor media relations.  By prohibiting 
foreign reporters in East Pakistan during the suppression of these riots, Yahya Khan 
turned the international media against Pakistan.  Also, while U.S. President Nixon, China, 
and some Muslim countries backed Pakistan, the rest of the world, including most 
Americans, favored the separatist Bengalis.  Nixon felt obliged to support Yahya Khan’s 
actions due to Yahya Khan’s support of Kissenger’s secret Chinese-American meeting 
which normalized relations.  The culmination of this disregard for world criticism 
allowed India to proceed in training the separatists in fighting and providing a haven for 
the Bengali’s exiled government.  Finally, instead of accepting any of the proposals from 
the UN for a withdrawal of troops, Yahya Khan, through Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto, suffered 
the humiliation of having 93,000 troops captured and losing the war.75 
General Zia ul-Haq faced the threat of internal societal disruption after the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, with its Shi’a ascendancy, railed against his Sunni brand of 
Islamization.  Zia’s regime centers around the dichotomy he brought both to Pakistan and 
to the military with his Islamization program.  Heretofore, Pakistan’s governance 
remained secularized.  By instituting Islamism into Pakistan’s governance, he 
exacerbated the Sunni-Shi’a schism in society.  Pakistan’s societal religious schism 
became, for the first time, a fixture in Pakistan’s military.  A Pakistani soldier’s career 
suddenly became defined more by his religious sect and amount of piety and less by his 
ability as a professional soldier.  An officer who drank whiskey could expect to lose his 
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career.  A Shi’ite who was an absolute professional, and a moderate, might expect 
promotion.  A pious Sunni, of mediocre proficiency, however, could expect promotion 
without hesitation.   
How did Zia monitor such moralistic proclivities?  First, entry into Pakistan’s 
military required a questionnaire that included not just religious affiliation but that also 
asked for sect.  A Shi’a soldier could face immediate discrimination simply from a glance 
at his identification.76  Second, Zia created a post at each division and higher 
headquarters for a mullah whose office ostensibly gave religious guidance to regimental 
and battalion chaplains.  In reality, these mullahs who occupied their respective 
headquarters G-277 Religion (vice G-2 Intelligence) sections functioned much like the 
political officers in the Soviet Union’s military.  G-2 Religion mullahs monitored officers 
and characterized the officer’s degree of piety, formalized in a report that evaluated the 
officer on a scale of one (not pious) to five (highly pious).  This injection of religious 
morality created a schism in Pakistan’s embodiment of nationalism that also reflected in 
Pakistan’s society as evidenced by Pakistan’s increasing sectarian violence.78   
Iran employed a policy of encouraging Shi’a unrest in Pakistan.  Zia overplayed 
the value of the Shi’a unrest and over responded both domestically and regionally.  Zia 
approached the exogenous issue with his Afghan policy. In other words, he supported 
militant Sunni factions to fight indigenous as well as Iranian Shi’as in Afghanistan.  This 
later became the basis of the Mujahideen.  Zia’s adept handling of the Mujahideen 
guerrilla effort against the Soviets in the Afghanistan War, possibly better attributed to 
the abilities of the ISI, can be seen in a positive light because it succeeded.  Finally, Zia’s 
insistence on aggravating the Kashmir issue meant that he would have to reject the Simla  
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Agreement signed by his predecessor Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto.  This decision resulted in the 
denial of Pakistan’s appeal for re-entry into the Commonwealth, an important 
international forum.79   
Musharraf’s most significant foreign policy decision has been to support the U.S. 
GWOT.  Far greater than any other country, Pakistan has more to lose than any other 
country in choosing to support the United States.  The long-term result, however, 
promises a tremendous payoff value in terms of regional stability and the follow-on 
‘peace dividend’.  U.S. intervention in South Asian politics catapulted Pakistani-Indian 
relations into a new intensity of entente.  This entente so far has reopened cross-border 
bus services, with train and air travel quickly approaching, and has generated plans for 
the first ever Pakistani-led, South Asian, multi-nation peace keeping effort.  The greatest 
long-term benefit will be the relaxation of tensions between India and Pakistan.   
How does Pakistan’s military support of U.S. interests affect Pakistan’s foreign 
policy?  Military support in this definition includes the government since the Army Chief 
of Staff (General Musharraf) is the head of the government.  This is more thoroughly 
reflected in the name of Pakistan’s senior most policy making body. The eight-member 
council is called the Security Council instead of being given a more generic bureaucratic 
name.  Musharraf’s decision to support U.S. interests profoundly affects the extent to 
which he conducts foreign policy.  Pakistan’s support requires U.S. involvement in 
brokering funding through international agencies (e.g. the International Monetary Fund), 
establishing regional peace initiatives (the most ever seen between Pakistan and India), 
and holding more sway in international politics.  Pakistan could not have achieved these 
as swiftly on its own.  Most significantly, Pakistan can achieve something that it could 
not previously do. It can now provide diplomatic solutions that alleviate the need for 
continued military solutions in securing itself against external threats.   
3. Domestic Policy 
Ayub Khan’s failure in foreign policy also spelled failure in his domestic policy 
as “not only the Pakistani people’s sense of national solidarity but also the standards of  
                                                 
79 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 71. 
54
public morality, financial discipline, law and order as well as bureaucratic efficiency—all 
seem to have gone downhill.”80  Ayub Khan’s indifference to the Bengalis of East 
Pakistan contributed to rising separatist issues.   
The most dramatic instance of the military’s influence on domestic politics came 
in 1971 when Yahya Khan used the military in an attempt to quash riots in East Pakistan.  
These riots erupted after Mujibur Rahman, an East Pakistani candidate for prime 
minister, won the election but was not permitted to assume the role.  These riots sparked 
a separatist rebellion that severed Pakistan and brought independence to Bangladesh.  
Having precluded the Bengalis from having a representative voice in democratic 
elections, Yahya Khan’s legitimacy fell, and he was forced to provide for new elections 
in a truncated Pakistan.   
General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977 and instituted his Islamization 
program.  Efforts of this program elevated certain Islamic parties into government 
positions and hosted a fanfare of Islamic ‘reforms’ that gave the appearance of an Islamic 
state.  Unwilling to acquiesce to meaningful Islamic reforms (such as replacing 
Pakistan’s constitution with an Islamic one, based more as a theocracy than a 
democracy), Zia alienated both the Islamic movement and those calling for the 
restoration of democracy.  In the end, Zia and many of his ‘Islamic’ higher staff died 
when a bomb exploded in their aircraft.  The worst domestic error that Zia made centered 
on his religious sectarian bias in his Islamization program.  While sponsoring sectarian 
fighting in Afghanistan may work, his sponsoring of Sunni activism against a largely 
moderate Shi’a community inside Pakistan sparked a wave of Shi’a activism in direct 
response.  His encouragement of sectarian activism and its resultant violence sharply 
exacerbated an already divided seam in Pakistan’s society. 
How does Pakistan’s military support of U.S. interests affect Pakistan’s domestic 
policy?  Musharraf’s decision to support the U.S. GWOT threatens to split Pakistan’s 
society along its ethnic, religious, and political seams.  Providing direct military 
assistance against the Taliban, an almost entirely Pashtun organization, means alienating 
the Pashtun ethnic group.  Pashtuns already threaten separation, both politically and 
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violently, as an independent Pashtunistan.  Heightening this issue is the Islamic form of 
government that the Pashtuns seek in contrast to the secular Pakistani laws.  Religious 
sectarian violence continues between Muslims and Sikhs, and between Sunni and Shi’a 
factions unabated.  Musharraf’s inability to prevent sectarian violence harms his already 
questionable legitimacy.  Finally, his handling of Kashmir, particularly his recent 
ceasefire agreement, is likely to be the cause of the recent attempt on his life.  Whether or 
not the attempt was botched or merely a warning, it clearly sends the message that 
Islamic militants will not tolerate the loss of Kashmir.   
Will President Musharraf be able to continue authoritarian rule while Pakistanis 
call for democratic elections?  Historically, Pakistani citizens welcomed military coups as 
a stabilizing factor that returns power to democracy once the crisis ends.  Sometimes 
even the government upholds authoritarian rule.  While Ayub Khan managed to rule for a 
decade, Yahya Khan lasted only a couple of years.  Zia-ul-Haq remained in power for 
over a decade possibly because of the influx of monies because of the Afghan War, 
before he acquiesced to an election.  Once he reneged on this election, he was no longer 
trusted to complete the results of a new election and was killed.   
How long Musharraf can perpetuate his regime depends largely on the legitimacy 
he continues to generate.  His authority began when “Pakistan's Supreme Court validated 
the coup and granted Musharraf executive and legislative authority for three years from 
the coup date…[and when] Musharraf named himself as president…was sworn in...[H]is 
presidency was extended for five more years.”81  Musharraf wisely used the existing 
governmental mechanisms to gain legitimacy and may find a solution to maintaining it by 
providing his opposition inclusion in the political process through government posts, sub-
national elections, or fair judicial review.  He must ensure that Pakistani forces conduct, 
or at least lead, any actions within Pakistan’s borders.  Pakistan, like many former British 
colonies, resent the idea of an imperialistic occupation.  Thus, Pakistan’s military 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan’s military encompasses more than the sum of its Army, Navy, and Air 
Force.  It represents the nation’s intelligence network and its military industrial complex.  
Pakistan’s military leaders provided leadership for more than half of Pakistan’s 57-year 
existence.  These leaders exercised Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy even during 
many of the years when civilian governance existed.  Pakistan’s military impacts 
Pakistan’s domestic economy directly even to the point of determining Pakistan’s 
economic policies as well as placing Pakistan’s economy in jeopardy due to its budgetary 
influence during civilian governance. 
Religious based schisms institutionalized in Pakistan’s military reflected in 
Pakistan’s society because of Zia’s Islamization program.  If it is not possible to keep 
Pakistan’s singular source of national unity unfettered by institutionalized religion, then 
Pakistan itself cannot remain cohesive.  This lack of national cohesion explodes into 
sectarian violence and only Pakistan’s military can unify the country.  At this point, 
Pakistan’s military no longer suffers religious schism, but it must do more than re-unify 
itself. It must be used to re-unify Pakistan.  This process is beginning now as non-
Punjabis increasingly find a career in Pakistan’s military. 
Pakistan’s military institution provides a robust capability in the new fight on the 
periphery supporting the GWOT.  Besides providing the United States. physical space to 
operate from or in, Pakistan’s military offers the United States an ability to wage the 
GWOT within Pakistan’s borders without engendering an anti-imperialistic (American) 
social movement. 
On the other hand, the limits of U.S. support of a military regime were reached 
when Pakistan pursued the use of the Taliban and other jihadis as the method to its 
foreign policy in regional affairs.  This placed a distance between Pakistan’s military 
regime and the United States.  What does this portend for future U.S. support for 
Pakistan’s military regimes?  The cost that has so far been the breaking point for U.S. 
support of Pakistan’s military regimes has been Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons 
and its usurpation of democratic processes.  During the 1980’s, the United States 
overlooked both of these in order to wage the ideological war against communism.  This 
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condoning of Pakistan’s policies ended abruptly during George H.W. Bush’s 
administration which was all the more telling in that this administration intended to 
maintain a strong relationship with Pakistan.  The lesson to be drawn at this point is that 
so long as Pakistan provides a key role in assisting the United States towards its primary 
national security goals, the United States will support a military regime.  This support 
however will be withdrawn once the goal has been achieved due to U.S. domestic 
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V. PAKISTAN’S MILITARY SUPPORT OF U.S. NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY GOALS: 2001 AND BEYOND 
In response to the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, President Bush 
promulgated a revision to the National Security Strategy (NSS) that articulates a new 
kind of policy.  This new global war on terrorism (GWOT) emphasizes the importance of 
the United States fighting its adversaries in many peripheral settings across the globe.  
The history of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship revolves around Pakistan’s past role as a 
U.S. ally in a peripheral battle against communism.  The GWOT brings this past role into 
current operation but in a more direct manner.  Unlike the furtive role Pakistan’s military 
played in providing the Mujahideen training, intelligence and weapons during the Afghan 
War; the GWOT openly incorporates Pakistani military forces in its daily operations.   
In order to answer the question of how Pakistan’s military can assist the United 
States achieve its NSS goals in a post-9/11 world, it is necessary to discern the 
environment that characterizes the U.S.-Pakistani relationship and identify the factors that 
contribute to policy making.  What Pakistani interests detract from Pakistan’s ability to 
function as a U.S. ally?  How does this affect Pakistan’s ability to remain a reliable 
partner of the United States?  How can Pakistan’s military capability be best used to 
assist the United States achieve its NSS goals?  What benefits does Pakistan gain that 
makes cooperation possible?  This chapter examines how the United States translates its 
NSS goals into objectives that Pakistan’s military can achieve.  It examines how 
Pakistan’s military assists the United States reach its NSS goals by analyzing how U.S. 
and Pakistani national interests coincide or diverge within the context of the GWOT.  It 
illustrates the manner in which Pakistan’s military supports the United States’ Operation 
Enduring Freedom as well as embarking upon other regional stability producing 
objectives.  This paper will also explore the expanding nature of Pakistan’s military roles 
in response to the U.S. NSS. 
A. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002: A NEW KIND OF 
POLICY 
The global war on terrorism is a policy not a war.  This is an important distinction 
because it reflects a decision point in the American worldview.  President Bush’s 2002 
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NSS outlined a new global policy oriented on an anti-terrorist campaign.  This NSS 
significantly lends focus to U.S. foreign policy that had been largely missing during the 
1990’s as the United States tried to articulate the role of its military and instead centered 
mainly on domestic economic interests.  Terrorism directed specifically at the domestic 
United States focused foreign policy development towards a new goal.  During the Cold 
War, the American worldview perceived a battle between the forces of democracy and 
communism, thus prompting the containment of communism as the center piece of U.S. 
national and military strategies.  Today’s enemy, however, represents a series of disparate 
social grievances and perhaps even social movements rather than a singular hostile 
nation.  This is George Bush’s vision of the threat to the United States: 
That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race 
which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and 
discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we 
are by failing ones.  We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by 
catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.  We must 
defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.82  –The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America- September 2002 
The decision facing Americans face is whether they see the GWOT as a war, 
which necessarily has an end with the eradication of the last terrorist or whether they see 
the GWOT as a long-term solution that precludes an environment where terrorists can 
form, train, or even be seen as a legitimate means of protest.  By seeing the GWOT as 
merely a direct action against terrorists, the United States will continually be reacting to a 
growing problem.  By treating the GWOT as a two-point solution, one directly against 
known terrorists, and one directed at the cause of terrorism, it is possible to reduce the 
probability of a future generation of terrorists.  President Bush’s NSS of 2002 provides a 
two-point view.  How to stop terrorism is well beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
understanding the facets of the U.S. NSS and how Pakistan’s military can contribute to 
assisting the United States reach its NSS goals warrants examination.   
B. PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC & REGIONAL INTERESTS 
What domestic Pakistani interests detract from Pakistan’s ability to function as a 
U.S. ally?  Two important detractors currently exist that may preclude the full potential of                                                  
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support from Pakistan’s military institution.  These detractors center on the divergence of 
U.S. and Pakistani national interests.  The first detractor is Pakistan’s fear of a hostile 
India intent on Pakistan’s collapse since partition in 1947.  This issue dominates 
Pakistan’s military thinking, which drives the need for a force potent enough to deter 
Indian aggression.  The second detractor lies in the aftermath of the 1980’s Afghanistan 
War.  This detractor points to Pakistan’s support of insurgency during the Afghanistan 
War and to latent ties and sympathies towards the Taliban; a force Pakistan has used for 
almost a decade to further its interests in Afghanistan.  How does this affect Pakistan’s 
ability to remain a reliable U.S. partner?  Pakistan’s military remains a constant supporter 
of U.S. interests despite the nature of war on the periphery and proves itself invaluable in 
supporting the U.S.’ GWOT.  However, it suffers from linkages of some elements to the 
very organizations that the United States opposes.   
1. Fear of Indian Aggression 
Pakistan fears Indian aggression more than any other threat.  Numerically, 
Pakistan cannot win a conventional war against India and promotes nuclear deterrence to 
protect itself from attack.  Since the 1947 War, the times that Pakistan has fought against 
India (1965 and Kargil in 1999) have largely been the result of miscalculations of Indian 
response in what were supposed to have been limited skirmishes.  In order to offset the 
numerical difference, Pakistan uses insurgent forces to maintain a claim on Kashmir.  
While this strategy limits 50,000 Indian troops, it stands in the way of the U.S. GWOT in 
two manners. 
Jihadis do not readily de-radicalize when Pakistan changes its rhetoric or even its 
long-term policy.  They continue to act violently and may direct their efforts at the 
Pakistani government if they perceive a threat to their struggle to gain Kashmir.  Finally, 
jihadis may conduct terrorist operations in India (not Kashmir), which profound affects 
regional stability.  
Indian threats are taken seriously and Pakistan reacts accordingly by redistributing 
troops to the eastern border and mobilizing.  These actions could seriously derail on-
going operations or encroach upon logistics and air bases t currently provided to the  
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United States.  The possibility of a scenario exists in which an al-Qaeda member could 
bomb an Indian target to stimulate an offensive Indian posturing that would disrupt on-
going U.S. efforts in support of OEF at a crucial timeframe.   
2. Latent Ties to the Taliban 
Three increasingly broad levels link Pakistan to the Taliban; individual, political-
national, and social-national.  Individually, Pakistani military personnel, especially the 
Army and ISI, have fought along side the Taliban forging strong sympathies if not 
outright loyalties.  These individuals are now reaching the upper echelons of their 
organizations.  These ties are smaller in scale, but harder to sever.83  On the political-
national level, Pakistan’s Afghan policy began its political ties with the Taliban in 1994, 
developing a working relationship that supports Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan.  To 
renounce this political concession, the United States will have to ensure that 
Afghanistan’s government is friendly with Pakistan, especially on issues of Pashtun 
ethnic nationalism.  The national-social level recognizes the ethnic Pashtun composition 
of the Taliban and the resultant fissures in Pakistan’s society that could arise when the 
government targets individuals of a single ethnicity.  Pakistan must assuage Pashtun 
ethnicity issues as it dissolves its ties to the Taliban.  Each of these three levels ties 
Pakistan into ethnic and political problems necessary to address in order to prevent social 
mobilization from taking root and resulting in a separatist rebellion.  Pakistan’s 
maintenance of a porous border allowed better use of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  These 
areas also allowed for the training of jihadis, used to perpetuate the border issue in 
Kashmir.  Pakistan’s ties to the Taliban were at the heart of Pakistan’s Afghanistan 
policy.84  Pakistan’s ties to jihadis in Kashmir represented Pakistan’s (perceived) best 
hope at prolonging the Kashmir issue until Pakistan could attain a favorable conclusion.  
The question of how well Pakistan’s military can support U.S. interests rests on whether 
or not Pakistan’s military can divest itself of linkages to the Taliban and jihadis eager to 
fight in Kashmir.   
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Pakistan’s domestic problems represent both a difficult and expansive set of 
problems including a society beset with religious and ethnic schisms fired both from 
within (as a result of Zia’s Islamization) and from without (including religious 
sectarianism exported from Iran and Saudi Arabia).  Conversely, Pakistan reaped success 
in its opium eradication program, which forcibly redeveloped Pakistan’s poppy 
cultivation into grain harvests by destroying the poppy fields and providing farmers with 
the tools, seed, and financial incentives to make transition possible.  This became a 
serious problem for organized crime, which largely switched to smuggling Afghanistan-
grown opium, and re-affirmed Pakistan’s monopoly on coercive force within its borders.  
The U.S. NSS seeks to address these types of issues with both U.S. support and with the 
support of Pakistan’s military.  ISI possesses a wide array of informational and military 
assets to assist local police fight organized crime.   
C. U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
Historically, U.S. relations with Pakistan usually came to the detriment of 
relations with India, while seeking better relations with India came at the cost of losing 
relations with Pakistan.  “Since last [2001] September’s attacks, however, the United 
States has found itself in the unaccustomed position of having good relations with India 
and Pakistan at the same time.”85  The United States must capitalize on this opportunity 
and prevent perceptions of U.S. bias from reviving the previous zero-sum game. 
On 12 September 2001, the Pakistani embassy conveyed to the U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State, Rich Armitage, that President Musharraf pledged Pakistan’s support to 
the United States.  By 14 September 2001, Musharraf convinced his military staff that it 
would be in Pakistan’s interest to align itself with the United States.  This decision caused 
Pakistan to re-assess its long-standing Afghanistan policy and holds deep social and 
political implications.86  How deeply was this felt in Pakistan?  General Musharraf stated 
that: 
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The tragedy of 9/11 transformed security policies and changed 
geopolitical calculations. Pakistan took a strategic decision, based on the 
principles of humanity and our national interest, to support the war on 
terrorism. Our intentions should be in no doubt. Our actions speak louder 
than words. Our capabilities were limited but have been progressively 
improved. We are acting against Al-Qaeda and its associates effectively. 
We have also acted against other organizations or groups involved in any 
form of terrorism. Pakistan will remain in the forefront of the war on 
terrorism.87 
President Bush promulgated the United States’ new NSS in 2002 to address these 
types of regional concerns and domestic issues.  U.S. commitment to the goals outlined in 
the NSS diminishes Pakistan’s fears of a hostile India and opens the door for the 
Pakistani government to cut ties with the Taliban, already indicated by the positive 
engagements between Delhi and Islamabad as a warming of relations.  However, the 
United States also had to consider the implications of a partnership with Pakistan. 
The major areas of U.S. concern in Pakistan include: nuclear 
nonproliferation; counterterrorism; regional stability; democratization and 
human rights; and economic reform and development.  An ongoing 
Pakistan-India nuclear arms race, fueled by rivalry over Kashmir, 
continues to be the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia 
and a major issue in U.S. relations with both countries.88  
The U.S. State Department regards Musharraf’s “country [as] one of our closest 
allies in the global war on terror,” and that the attempt on his life “demonstrates that 
Pakistan faces as serious a threat from terrorism as other countries on the front lines [in] 
the war on terror.”89  The State Department highlights the points on which Pakistan 
supports the U.S. GWOT illustrating that “[s]ince 2001 Pakistan has provided 
extraordinary assistance in the War on Terror by capturing and turning over…more than 
500 al-Qaida members.”90    
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The United States also offers incentives for Pakistan, other than lifting sanctions 
based on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.  Financially, the United States dramatically 
increased “economic assistance to Pakistan, providing debt relief and support for a major 
effort at education reform...[and] intends to provide Pakistan $3 billion in economic and 
military aid over the next 5 years.”91  According to the Department of States’ 
Country/Account Summaries (‘Spigots’), the United States provided Pakistan with 
$1,044,994,000.00 in FY02.92  However, even though 9/11 reinvigorated U.S.-Pakistani 
relations, Pakistan’s regional fears can hamper this relationship. 
The terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December of 2001, just three 
months after Pakistan’s promise to assist in the GWOT, shows the ability of a small 
group93 to influence the actions of two larger nations and to disrupt the military 
operations of the United States in Afghanistan.94  This singular terrorist action caused a 
military reaction across the region and could have led to the possibility of a regional 
war.95  In mid-December 2001, American forces engaged members of al-Qaeda in the 
mountainous region of northeast Afghanistan bordering Pakistan.96  The operational plan 
called for American forces to encircle al-Qaeda on three sides and push them south down 
a valley to the Pakistani border where positioned Pakistani troops could trap the al-Qaeda 
fighters.97  As this operation was forming, India shifted 170,000 forces towards the 
Pakistani border in response to an Islamic terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.  
Pakistan, fearful of Indian aggression, countered by pulling troops off its western border 
with Afghanistan and re-deploying them to its eastern border.  The encirclement did not 
occur and al-Qaeda slipped away into the mountains.   
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The United States gains much from allaying Pakistan’s fears, not the least of 
which is securing a tactically reliable ally during challenging events.  The United States 
can better rely on Pakistan’s military forces being available by brokering peace between 
Pakistan and India.  This precludes Pakistan’s military from deploying east at critical 
times.  More importantly, stopping Indian support for Pashtun separatist elements denies 
sympathizers a reason to support the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Kashmir.  The United 
States must also place diplomatic pressure on Iran to stop sponsoring the Shi’a 
sectarianism both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan if the expectation is curtailment of 
sectarian violence. 
How does the Pakistani military support U.S. interests in the post 9/11 
environment?  After joining the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, and faced with a new 
confrontation over Kashmir, Pakistan resolved to crack down on terrorists operating 
within its borders.  The questionable results tend to follow a pattern of U.S. pressure 
forcing the capture of a nominal number of terrorists.  Pakistan’s inability to produce 
more than a token number of arrests after being pressured may signal Pakistan’s 
reluctance to completely cut its previous ties and shift its policies in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir.  However, Secretary of State Colin Powell applauded the involvement of 
Pakistan in combating terrorism on its own soil. 98 
Should the United States continue to support Musharraf’s military regime or press 
for a return to democracy?  Supporting an authoritarian while delaying democracy might 
seem like a point of divergence, but it may be in the best interest of both countries to 
continue this process of gradual return to democracy rather than try to force democracy 
unhesitatingly.  The ‘polarized religious opposition’ argument rests on the premise of the 
eventual ouster of an authoritarian regimeby a regime that polarized on religious issues 
since Musharraf is pointedly secular.  The historical analogy cited is the Shah’s 
overthrow in the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  The problem with this argument is that it 
disregards the legitimacy that Pakistan’s government affords to Musharraf in addition to 
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the lack of a widespread anti-regime social mobilization based on Islamic framing.99  
While political structures and mobilizing structures are present, opposition groups are 
still afforded as well as partake in political institutional inclusion albeit not in electing the 
president.   
Liberal critics argue that a “benign military dictator is no substitute for a 
participatory democratic process” and that “Musharraf has weakened the country's 
Parliament, Supreme Court and other government institutions, as well as its two main 
secular parties.” Additionally, while it may be true that “Pakistan needs to develop its 
institutions and not be so dependent on one person.”100, logic would dictate a gradual 
return to democracy so that parties could better array themselves for consensus rather 
than the factional infighting that decayed the national political process leading to a 
military coup.  
The United States views Pakistan’s authoritarian leadership as a legitimate source 
of national leadership.  Despite the incongruent nature of supporting the idea of 
democracy and a military authoritarian, the United States cannot adopt a shortsighted 
plan that insists on a democratically elected national leader.  When elected, each of 
Pakistan’s previous civilian governments during the 1990’s sought to ensure their hold in 
office by pitting one faction against another so that none was strong enough to represent a 
threat.  This practice exacerbated rifts in Pakistani society and the rioting prompted 
General Musharraf to lead a coup to re-establish security and civil order.  Pakistanis 
welcomed the act…as a temporary measure.  As such, Pakistan’s military became the 
only national institution that could provide unity in a country falling apart at multiple 
schisms.  Despite being a military authoritarian, Musharraf allows a degree of civilian 
governance to continue under military rule.  Pakistan’s legislative branch passes laws and 
its judiciary branch also continues to provide its checks and balances.  However, 
Musharraf holds the executive branch closely claiming both the office of the President 
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and continuing as the Chief of the Army, a situation that clearly rails against the Pakistani 
constitution.  For the time being, Musharraf’s cooperation provides the United States with 
stable assistance in the GWOT without the negative aspect of a violently repressive 
regime normally associated with military authoritarians. 
D. ROLES PAKISTAN’S MILITARY CAN PLAY IN ASSISTING U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY GOALS 
Pakistan’s military fulfills Pakistani society’s deeply entrenched need for security.  
The United States must nurture a change in this mindset without disrupting the legitimacy 
that Pakistan’s military holds.  In order for Pakistan’s military to assist in fulfilling the 
U.S. NSS goals, the United States must clearly articulate its needs in order for Pakistan to 
evaluate what is being required of its military.  Identification of Pakistan’s military 
infrastructure is required to determine what roles it can and cannot complete.  Beyond 
physical constraints and limitations on the roles Pakistan’s military can conceivably 
accomplish, it must also take into account political, ethnic, religious, and criminal 
considerations.  Translating these goals into military objectives and then coordinating 
those objectives becomes a prerequisite for success.  Providing multinational military 
linkages contributes to tactical and operational success.  United States Central Command 
(CENTCOM) Commanding General Abizaid summarized how Pakistan’s military 
coordinates with U.S. forces in a testimony to the House Armed Services Committee: 
President Musharraf has made great strides in curtailing the influence of 
terrorists within his nation and the Pakistani Army has become more 
effective along the Afghan border… [He] has begun a long term strategy 
to engage the tribal leaders in these areas [by] offering them access to 
government resources if they purge the terrorists from their area of 
control, but at the same time, he is prepared to take military action against 
those found non-compliant. We are supporting these efforts through 
increased intelligence sharing and security assistance while improving 
operational coordination between CFC Afghanistan and the Pakistani 
military. We also conduct regular meetings between Afghan, Pakistani and 
U.S. Military leaders to promote transparency and cooperation between 
governments along the border.101 
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Pakistan’s military assists the United States in reaching its NSS goals in several 
ways, such as providing significant opportunities for the United States in intelligence 
collaboration102, airspace use, and with bases for operations, logistics support and 
airfields.  The cooperation of Pakistan’s military enables Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) and its many smaller operations, some of which are on going.  Pakistan’s leading 
of a coalition of South Asian countries on a United Nations (UN) mission to the Congo is 
evidence of cooperative action and regional stability objectives.  Each of these is a direct 
military action resulting from the United States’ current NSS but may suffer from the 
intermittent ambiguity of Pakistan’s domestic politics fearful of Indian aggression and 
latent sympathies towards the Taliban and jihadis.  The following sections briefly 
describe how Pakistan’s military can directly or indirectly contribute to assisting the 
United States achieve five of the eight goals outlined in the U.S. NSS103.   
1. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity 
Pakistani forces can assist in achieving this goal in two primary manners.  As 
described earlier, the Taliban advocates an oppressive form of Islam that creates fear in 
innocent civilians, denies education and other rights to women, and promotes brutality in 
establishing ‘justice’.  Direct military action that assists in the destruction of the Taliban 
removes the forces that propagate this culture of fear.  Second, Pakistan’s military 
institution can assist local police forces against organized violent crime in the form of 
information sharing and as a forcible deterrent.  Organized crime represents a national 
threat to freedom at the grassroots.  Local police, politicians, and judges often ignore or 
dismiss charges against criminals backed by criminal organizations, which brutally 
intimidate and sometimes kill officials attempting to enforce the rule of law.104  
Conversely, U.S. support of Pakistan’s military leader also raises questions about 
the contradiction between promoting human dignity with its inherent democratic 
principles and prolongation of a regime that suppresses these values.  The previous                                                  
102 Pakistan’s military can provide “information that is often unavailable from U.S. intelligence 
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chapters illustrated how U.S. support towards Pakistan’s military regimes waned after 
U.S. national security goals had been achieved and Pakistan’s military regimes continued 
to usurp civilian governance.  Will the United States support Pakistan’s military regimes 
once Operation Enduring Freedom ends?  This question depends on the extent to which 
Pakistanis feel that their rights have been violated.  An indication may well be found in 
the amount and type of political parties that Musharraf (and any future military 
successor) allows to be active.  If Musharraf permits the moderates to continue political 
contestation for power then there will be a degree of social outlet in the political arena.  
However, if Musharraf finds this contestation a threat to his regime and suppresses the 
moderates it will radicalize them.  At this point, the threat of a social movement to 
overthrow the U.S. backed regime could quickly develop into an event damaging to U.S. 
credibility and interests similar to the backing of the Shah in Iran.  The best solution lies 
in supporting the current regime to the extent that suppressions of freedoms do not incur 
a large scale social movement.  At the same time, the United States must work to provide 
the infrastructure (educational, health, economic, etc.) that will support the viability of an 
elected government and urge Pakistan’s military regime to move towards civilian 
governance as soon as possible.  Because the GWOT is not likely to end soon, the United 
States cannot use this as the condition for ensuring Pakistan’s transition to civilian 
governance.   
2. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to 
Prevent Attacks Against the United States and Its Friends 
Pakistan’s military should prove most effective in fulfilling this NSS goal.  
Pakistan’s military forces focuses on direct military actions whether as a coalition force, 
as demonstrated over the past two years in eradicating the Taliban, or on its own.  The 
risk of using direct military action in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and in Balochistan hinges on the political 
volatility of these areas in direct confrontation with government forces over separatist 
issues.  On a positive note, Pakistan’s military enjoys access to tribal areas that it never 
could attain prior to joining the U.S. GWOT.  The risk of direct military action in 
Afghanistan is found in the resentment many Afghanis have for Pakistan, and as a result, 
Pakistani troops usually remain within Pakistan’s border.  An anti-Pakistani uprising in 
Afghanistan could easily carry into both the Afghan population in Pakistan as well as into 
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the separatist states of the NWFP and Balochistan.  Despite these risks, it is imperative 
that Pakistan engage militarily in the tribal areas as President Musharraf has directed.  
Since 2002, Pakistani troops have been regularly patrolling FATA areas increasing both 
its presence and its capabilities in patrolling the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.105  This 
effort to harden the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is crucial to establishing distinct 
Pakistan and Afghanistan national identities rather than fostering the ethnic identities that 
both transcend and threaten modern state borders.   
Pakistan’s military operation in March in Balochistan provides a good 
measurement of the capacity of FATA inhabitants for government involvement in FATA 
areas.  Forty-six Pakistani troops, 63 militants, and 15 civilians died in operations as 
Pakistan’s military attempted to capture suspected al-Qaeda members.  Despite the 
possibility of igniting Pashtun separatist nationalism, local inhabitants regarded the action 
as a legitimate use of force in asserting the government’s authority.  Pakistan’s army 
coupled this show of Pakistan’s resolve to support the GWOT with a policy of voluntary 
civilian demilitarization through a non-reciprocity weapons turn-in.  In order to alleviate 
Balochis’ fears of remaining defenseless, the Pakistani military offered Balochis the 
ability to join the army.106  The near term benefit meant the voluntary turn-in of weapons 
by locals while the long-term benefit means that the predominantly Punjabi107 army 
becomes ethnically diversified, and thereby gain the ability to moderate Pakistan’s 
military. 
The “successful use of military force…presupposes the ability to identify a 
terrorist perpetrator or its state sponsor, as well as the precise location of the group.”108  
Since the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces do not require large physical facilities, there are 
few fixed targets.  Instead of fighting a war of tangible assets, a war of loyalties, 
thoughts, and when identified, against armed forces is fought.  However, as intangible as 
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Al Qaeda and Taliban assets may be, they require funding to operate.  This funding is 
created in the poppy fields of Afghanistan, and believed to become fungible in the form 
of gold109 or cash as banking accounts have been seized.  It is possible to use Pakistan’s 
military forces (ground and air) in locating and destroying these crops in conjunction 
with or under the control of U.S. forces in order to prevent hostilities between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  However, there must be a corresponding investment of seed, 
fertilizer, and equipment to assist farmers in establishing food or cotton crops.110  
Providing 20-40 percent of U.S. consumed heroin and 70 percent of European consumed 
heroin, Afghanistan’s heroin traffic also supplies approximately 1.5 million heroin 
addicts in Pakistan, making the drug trade a $20 billion dollar business in Pakistan.111  
Hardening this border, therefore, would also curtail Pakistan’s domestic health issues 
surrounding heroin use. 
3. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts 
Of the regional issues between India and Pakistan, cross-border terrorism 
continues to spur on defensive mindsets, especially in Kashmir.  U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell described cross-border terrorism as something that “we [the United States 
and Pakistan] are committed to defeating…[and] there are still opportunities for 
dialogue.”112  Pakistan’s support of jihadis in Kashmir officially ended at the same time 
Musharraf declared alignment with the United States.113  This reversal, much like that 
with the Taliban, did not mean that cross-border terrorism stopped.  Pakistan and India 
both have much to lose if Kashmir goes to one side or the other.  Pakistan’s military must 
act in complete contrast with its actions in the 1999 Kargil conflict in which they 
infiltrated Kashmir at the town of Kargil dressed as jihadis.  Instead, Pakistan’s military 
must now prevent incursions by jihadis and secure its northern border.  To this point, 
Pakistan is hard pressed to deliver evidence that it is complying and its critics, especially 
in India, charge that Pakistan continues to support these elements. 
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4. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our 
Friends with WMD 
While nuclear non-proliferation is a major concern for the United States in the 
regional stabilization effort, nuclear forces do not represent a useful military tool in 
fighting the GWOT and not addressed in this paper.  However, since 9/11, the United 
States and Pakistan “have held talks on improving security and installing new safeguards 
on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants”114 in order to prevent these 
weapons from being used either by terrorists or by Pakistani military personnel that might 
stage a coup against President Musharraf or future governments.  
Despite U.S. efforts since President Carter to ‘punish’ Pakistan for its quest to 
acquire a nuclear weapons capability, the United States made concessions on this issue 
when it needed Pakistan’s help as evidenced by the waiving of the Pressler Amendment 
during the 1980’s and with the lifting of sanctions in 2001.  Despite the issuance of 
waivers for the nuclear weapons issue, the United States cannot have a partner that 
supports terrorists, especially not the Taliban.  To this end, Musharraf:  
has begun to address Pakistan’s many pressing and longstanding 
problems, including the beleaguered economy, corruption, terrorism, and 
poor governance. Pakistan will receive well over one billion dollars in 
U.S. assistance and several billion dollars from international organizations 
to help strengthen the country as a key member of the U.S.-led anti-
terrorism coalition.115 
Musharraf carried his stand against terrorism to the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) members stating that “NAM must be a strong, principled voice against 
terrorism…base[d] on [the] fact that no cause justifies acts of violence against innocent 
civilians”116 while using language to encourage international support for resolving long 
standing disputes (e.g. Kashmir).  Pakistan’s military (Nuclear Forces) must also work in 
conjunction with the United States to ensure security of its nuclear infrastructure as well 
as safeguarding its nuclear information.  This has become particularly troublesome as 
Pakistan’s preeminent nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, pleaded that Pakistan’s military 
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leadership had complicit knowledge of nuclear information transactions between himself 
and the North Korean government.  Pakistan’s ISI must work in conjunction with U.S. 
intelligence agencies to preclude further leakage of information and proliferation of 
nuclear equipment and technology.  Musharraf’s grip on ISI allows some assurance that 
this is being done.  The United States must cultivate the contacts and policies that will 
ensure cooperation in this endeavor under future civilian governance. 
5. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with Other Main Centers of 
Global Power 
Pakistan and India enjoy a degree of cooperation and dialogue unattainable in the 
first 54 years since partition.  This political cooperation also gained some headway in the 
para-military coast guards of both countries with clearly undefined borders. The 
international waterway is demarcated as an extension of a large creek that sometimes 
changes position during the rainy season.  Although it does not hold the same deep-
rooted feelings that Kashmir conjures, it does provide a starting point for the countries to 
discuss border issues as well as military cooperation. 
Remarkably, Pakistan currently leads a brigade sized coalition force under the 
United Nations (UN) mission MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) that includes 
infantry battalions from Bangladesh and Nepal, a Nepalese engineer unit, and a 
Bangladesh helicopter squadron.117  This type of collaboration, especially with 
Bangladesh, comes only from U.S. insistence and assistance in building peace in the 
region.118  This is in addition to the approximately 4,400 troops and observers that 
Pakistan contributes to other UN missions worldwide.119 
E. ECONOMIC FACTORS IN FIGHTING TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN 
The short-term dividend of providing Pakistan with economic assistance provides 
Pakistan’s military the assets it needs to patrol the FATA areas and begin to harden the 
Pakistani-Afghan border.  Longer-term dividends of economic assistance provide an 
alternative to the madrassah educational system thereby developing citizens better suited  
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to contribute positively to Pakistan’s society.  Throughout Pakistan’s history, the military 
institution played a key role in determining Pakistan’s economic viability.  This trend 
continues and Musharraf’s current efforts resonate well with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.   
Pakistan’s economy plays a key role in the environment in which 
Pakistanis live.  Pakistan’s ability to provide for internal security, basic 
health care, education, basic utilities (especially clean water), affordable 
housing, and social programs, institutional governance structures, etc. rely 
on one thing: financial capacity.  Increasing Pakistan’s economic viability 
would eventually provide for these basic needs diminishing frustration, 
despair, indignity and humiliation.  It will take decades to eradicate these 
feelings provided economic factors succeed. 120 
The United States demonstrates a vested interest in Pakistan’s economic viability.  
As depicted in the NSS, failed states present a threat to the United States in terms of 
possible future interventions either to stabilize a region or to fight hostile elements that 
flourish where the rule of law is absent.  The U.S. Department of State’s FY2004 
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations budget stated:  
Developing and sustaining a strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship will remain 
critical to a successful U.S. regional strategy for South Asia, and 
indispensable to continued progress in the global war on terrorism.  FY 
2004 security assistance to Pakistan will enable continued cooperation 
with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and will promote stability on its 
borders. Economic, development, and democratization assistance will 
promote reform and address the conditions that breed extremism by 
helping to stabilize the economy and strengthen social, political and 
economic institutions in ways visible to ordinary Pakistanis.  Improved 
border security and control in the regions of Pakistan adjoining 
Afghanistan is in the long-term interest of the United States, Pakistan and 
the region.121  
Pakistan’s military stands on the threshold of delivering economic reform by 
implementing policies outlined by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), currently applying an $8Bn dollar aid package to develop four large cities in 
Pakistan, ADB policies for a $2Bn improvement program in Balochistan, and the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The economic incentives for growth in Pakistan 
need a corresponding reform in Pakistan’s societal structures of the local police, 
governance, and domestic and foreign policy considerations, and issues.  For instance, it 
is possible to squander domestic economic interests if Pakistan’s military chooses to 
make a grab for Kashmir.  Why would this be a consideration?  Punjabis represent the 
primary stakeholders in gaining Kashmir whereas most Pakistanis might welcome a 
peaceful negotiation to the Kashmir issue.  Pakistan’s army, predominantly Punjabi, 
however, holds the ability to decide the issue based more on ethnic proclivities rather 
than on the nation’s interests.122  The long-term benefit discussed earlier of an ethnically 
representative military may help moderate Pakistan’s military decisions in the interests of 
Pakistan. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. NSS of 2002 reflects a new vision in American foreign policy that views 
the world in terms of a symbiotic whole in contrast to the democracy versus communism 
dichotomy of the Cold War.  To an extent, it acknowledges the correlation between 
societal grievances in foreign countries and U.S. domestic security.  Specifically, the U.S. 
NSS identifies the threat to the United States because of failed states.  The NSS provides 
the framework to begin a two point solution to combating terrorism by relying on both 
direct military actions against terrorists coupled with the intent “to help make the world 
not just safer but better”123 by directing resources at the causes of societal grievances.  
The danger that America faces to a long-term solution is that the GWOT becomes 
ingrained in the American psyche as one of fighting terrorists without a corresponding 
fight against the societal ills of the failed states where terrorism spawns.  The resultant 
outcome may define success as terrorist body counts and failure as coalition body counts 
along the same false presumptions touted during the Vietnam conflict.  A much broader 
societal scale and at a global level must measure success.   
Pakistan’s military institution directly assists U.S. efforts in the GWOT from 
support infrastructure to direct military engagement and indirectly meets U.S. NSS goals 
of regional stability making.  However, Pakistan’s military institution must relax its fears 
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of a hostile India and divest itself of alignment towards the Taliban to assist the United 
States completely in the GWOT.  The United States must be able to bridge the gap 
between these two countries, as it has already started, and assist Pakistan in finding 
solutions to the political and social problems that threaten the ethnic and sectarian seams 
in Pakistan’s society.  
The United States should continue to support Musharraf rather than push for a 
sudden democracy because a democratic government at this point may lead to a reversion 
to political chaos at a time that is still critical to conducting the GWOT in Afghanistan. 
Additionally, a democratic government is not as likely to be as accommodating towards 
U.S. interests and may be much slower in acting to assist when choosing to do so.  
Finally, a democratic consensus is likely not going to be as accepting of the regional 
peace initiatives currently underway.  Despite Pakistan’s government validating 
Musharraf’s presidency, U.S. support for Musharraf cannot be based on this thin veil of 
legitimacy.  Support for Musharraf’s regime should recognize the value of the media 
rather than his current censorship, take measures to avoid, rather than exacerbate tensions 
with India such as the current ceasefire, and allow institutionally inclusive rather than 
exclusive measures to diffuse opposition and gather consensus.  Fulfillment of U.S. 
interests depends on the Pakistani military’s ability to translate these prescriptions into 
attainable military actions.   
Sectarian violence and corruption continued but the economic issues have relaxed 
somewhat as U.S. economic assistance helped to stabilize Pakistan’s stagnated economy.  
The recent peace initiatives with India that Musharraf embraces could not have taken 
place under a civilian government.  U.S. support for Musharraf’s regime continues to pay 
dividends in efforts towards regional stability.124   
The Taliban presented Pakistan’s military institution with a solution to its 
domestic and foreign policy issues, notably it fought Pakistan’s Fourth War.  
Domestically, the Taliban became more of a liability than an asset.  Its value as a tool in 
Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy became questionable in the late 1990’s and has since 
become untenable due to the terrorist events of 9/11.  The United States positioned itself 
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to assist Pakistan end its Fourth War but must be able to address Pakistan’s main 
concerns: fear of Indian aggression and divesting Pakistan’s military and society from 
religious militancy, both from jihadis in Kashmir and from the Taliban.  Additionally, 
Pakistan requires assistance in guaranteeing religious-political and ethnic-political 
divisive elements from operating across its Afghanistan and Iranian borders.    
The United States creates regional stability by brokering confidence-building 
measures between Pakistan and India, thus increasing the reliability of Pakistan’s military 
to assist the United States in realizing its NSS goals.  This alleviates pressure at the 
national level to continue an Indian-focused regional strategy and sets the framework for 
redefining Pakistan’s national and military strategy in broader terms.  
Pakistan’s military leadership continues to provide national leadership until such a 
time that governance passes back into civilian hands.  The United States risks the 
unintended consequences of creating anti-U.S. criticism amongst Pakistan’s moderate 
majority if the U.S. does not take steps to provide the foundation for a transition to 
civilian governance.  This process underscores the responsibility for the United States to 
earnestly foster the economic and social structures that will encourage political consensus 
in civilian governance and ensure that Pakistan’s military regime hands over control prior 
to the outset of a large social movement demanding such action.  The United States views 
Pakistan’s authoritarian leadership as a legitimate source of national leadership but must 
recognize that this could change and be able to transition without hesitation.  The United 
States seeks to address the issues that could lead to Pakistan becoming a failed state 
rather than exerting a strong pressure against Pakistan for a return to democracy.  The 
United States supported military authoritarians in the past to gain its NSS goals, the 
difference this time being that the goal of the GWOT is a two-point solution that 
addresses the needs of Pakistan rather than simply using Pakistan as a staging ground for 
military actions against terrorist targets.  Future U.S. presidencies must recognize this 
distinguishing concept and continue actively participating in Pakistan’s development in 
order to preclude the possible failure of Pakistan, a return to regional conflict, and a 




The New Fight on the Periphery identifies the divergences of U.S. and Pakistani 
national security interests throughout its relationship.  The common thread woven 
through this relationship centers on Pakistan’s military, the one national institution with 
which Pakistanis regard as embodying Pakistan’s nationalism and its only institution 
capable of unifying Pakistan. 
The national security interests of the United States and Pakistan never converged.  
The United States saw the world as a contest between democracy and communism.  
Regional concerns were ancillary to the overall Cold War.  This view implies a global 
level perspective characterized by an ideological contest.  Pakistan identified its threat as 
a hostile India bent on Pakistan’s destruction.  Global concerns were beyond the scope of 
this immediate threat.  This view implies a regional level perspective characterized by a 
territorial contest.  At times, each could benefit from the other but neither country ever 
met the other’s needs.  The United States would never guarantee Pakistan’s complete 
territorial integrity, although Nixon did ensure West Pakistan’s integrity in 1971, and 
Pakistan would not confront communism except when it precluded a government 
compliant with Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan.  Pakistan’s warming relationship with 
communist China in the mid- to late 1960’s was a point of contention with the United 
States.  The divergence in joint efforts revolved not around what each country would do 
(e.g., fighting communists in Afghanistan), but why it would do it based on either an 
ideological or territorial purpose.  Even joint efforts proved to have conflicting results.   
U.S. preoccupation with rebuilding Europe and containing communism at the end 
of the Second World War meant that the relegation of South Asia to a secondary role 
although the United States by no means ignored the region.  Initially, the United States 
favored India and sought an alliance but could not convince India to drop its non-
alignment policy.  As the Soviet threat grew, Pakistan became a viable solution but the 
pacts made suffered from a lack of integrating U.S. and Pakistani national security 
interests.  Instead, these pacts and agreements demonstrated a Cold War aim rather than 
addressing the regional issues of concern to the member nation-states. 
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Pakistan’s civilian governments were not conducive to achieving U.S. interests in 
Pakistan because they never stabilized long enough for democracy to work.  Pakistan’s 
early governments turned over too quickly to gain a modicum of reassurance that U.S. 
interests would be understood, let alone achieved.  Z. A. Bhutto’s autocratic regime 
politicized the civilian bureaucracy to the point of corruption and stifled Pakistan’s 
economics by nationalizing many sectors of the economy both of which led to a failed 
government.  Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s quick reversals in governments 
hearkened back to Pakistan’s early days of regime turnovers.  Worse yet, they created 
political divisions within Pakistan that exacerbated Pakistan’s already frail social fabric.   
Pakistan’s military governments were by no means perfect even contributed in 
part to the loss of East Pakistan in 1971.  Despite this exception, Pakistan’s military 
governments are generally seen as saving Pakistan from the chaos of failing civilian 
governments and incur a certain amount of legitimacy as the government for short 
durations.  Yahya Khan’s confinement of the 1971 War to East Pakistan prevented an 
escalation with India that would have threatened West Pakistan.  Zia’s administration 
proved to be the most divisive of Pakistan’s military in which his Islamization program 
worsened religious sectarian violence both in the military and in society.  However, his 
macroeconomic stabilization effort benefited Pakistan’s economy in the near- and 
medium-term.  Musharraf’s administration began as an intervention out of necessity as 
Sharif attempted to oust Musharraf while Musharraf was out of the country.  The military 
asserted itself amidst Sharif’s failing government. 
U.S.-Pakistani relations reached their height during the Afghanistan War as both 
countries had a considerable stake in evicting the Soviets.  The divergence of interests led 
the United States to leave once its Cold War interests were reached, but left Pakistan 
unfulfilled and ill prepared to cope with the issues 2.2 million refugees brought to a 
country already divided along ethnic, political, separatist, and religious sectarian lines.  
The U.S. failure to foresee the unintended consequences of ignoring a partner’s national 
interests caused the United States to return at a much higher cost.   
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If the United States supports Pakistan’s military, then it must ensure that the 
military assesses the wider scope of social implications when it makes decisions.  The 
unintended consequences of partnering with the Taliban in the long term runs counter to 
region stability building.  In order for Pakistan’s military to develop regional stability 
options, the United States must inject a reasonable assurance of cooperation with India.  
The GWOT must also be fought inside Pakistan’s borders.  Pakistan’s military 
institution must be the one to do this without fostering the impression that U.S. forces are 
participants in order to prevent anti-American resentment.   
How capable is Pakistan of supporting U.S. policy as a front-line state?  A 
comparison of the results of each of the periods affecting U.S. policy in Pakistan gives a 
measure of the success to what the current policy brings and what other policy options 
could anticipate.  Pakistan remains a resolute ally even in the face of U.S. detachment 
between periods of concern to U.S. interests.  U.S. support of civilian regimes met with 
equal success to that of military regimes; more so as military regimes tended to drive 
foreign policy risks without consulting the United States (e.g., 1965 and Kargil in 1999).  
The incentives that the United States offers Pakistan have arguably been less than what it 
should be if the United States were truly committed to a long-term program of creating 
stability in the region rather than focusing on narrowly defined periods where U.S. 
interests were directly threatened.  The United States utilized Pakistan’s religious 
sectarian issues to form the basis of its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  In 
doing so, the United States exacerbated the religious sectarian schism.  From the roots of 
this program, Pakistan adopted the Taliban to maintain its anti-Shia efforts but lost 
control over it.  Now the United States and Pakistan not only face attempts at dismantling 
this creation, but also the organizations that model themselves after the Taliban.  Any 
policy options that the United States considers, and it must consider bringing stability to 
South Asia, must include a plan to address the vacuum of public education that the 
madrassahs currently fill.   
Would the U.S. War on Terrorism be threatened by unstable democracies typical 
of Pakistan’s history?  Stability is good, but democracy must necessarily undergo the 
failure of political polarization before the establishment of peace of political coalitions.  
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Historically, a military coup takes place each time a democratically elected government 
starts to falter.  Instead of allowing it to falter and pay the short-term consequences of a 
failed government, the military steps in to establish control.  This may not be the best 
answer for a long-term democratic solution.  The answer lies in assisting Pakistan in 
creating and empowering the state institutions necessary to enforce social order.   
U.S. support of Pakistan’s military regimes may have a negative impact on 
Pakistan’s legitimacy in the eyes of religious extremists (especially the Taliban) and in 
courting disapproval towards the United States over human rights issues at the 
international level.  On the other hand, the importance of stability produced by military 
regimes is significant in dealing with a nuclear weapon capable state.  The problem is that 
politically oppressed freedoms and a broken economy will eventually spell disaster.  The 
United States implemented a long-term strategy to assist Pakistan with economic aid and 
in preparing the structural apparatus and competent bureaucracy for democracy to 
succeed.  U.S. success in securing a stable South Asia depends on Pakistan’s success.  
Pakistan’s success depends on continued U.S. support beyond President Bush.   
The question that must now be confronted is whether or not U.S. and Pakistani 
interests can produce a long-term relationship built upon a common positive goal.  This 
cannot occur unless U.S. and Pakistani national security interests serve a common goal 
with a common purpose.  Either Pakistan must begin to see its interests in a broader 
global perspective or the United States must realize that its national security interests 
(domestic security) lies in the regional interests of Pakistan and other countries.  To this 
end, Pakistan must much more globally minded by taking part in UN missions (MUNOC) 
and establishing global economic ties with a reduction in its trade barriers.  President 
Bush’s NSS of September 2002 clearly recognizes the threat to domestic security that 
failed nation-states can represent.  To this end, the NSS articulates U.S. interests in 
assisting nation-states build stability within their borders and regionally with neighboring 
nation-states.  South Asia provides a perfect example of how the United States redirected 
its efforts towards easing the tensions between Pakistan and India and designed a peace 
process encouraging long-term regional stability. 
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The danger exists that the United States will see the GWOT as a war and not as a 
policy and be susceptible to forgetting the importance of resolving regional tensions.  The 
second danger lies in the turnover of regimes.  If President Bush is not re-elected, will the 
next president continue the goals delineated in the Bush administration’s NSS?   
The U.S. guarantee of security for Pakistan, both from India as well as from 
interventionists such as Iran, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan, asked for since 
1947, is finally an absolute requirement for U.S.’ national interests.  The Afghanistan 
government is far from retaining the monopoly of coercive power in Afghanistan.  It does 
not control weapons within Afghanistan nor does it have any real power to prevent 
opium-funded organized crime.  Since it is in the United States’ interest to remain for an 
indefinite time in the region, it stands to reason that it will continue to require military 
assistance from Pakistan.  This, in turn, means that the United States must continue to 
contribute to Pakistan’s wellbeing.  With no end in sight in the near future, it makes sense 
that it is in the United States’ interest to assist Pakistan in its interests over an extended 
duration.  During this time, every effort should be to taken to assist Pakistan to be able to 
function as a reliable partner even after U.S. forces leave at some future date.  If the U.S. 
leaves without ensuring Pakistan’s ability to be an economically and socially successful 
state, the United States may very well have to return to ensure U.S. domestic security. 
The United States turned its back on democracy in Iran in 1953 supporting the 
Shah and creating a dictatorship.  Does this risk exist in Pakistan?  Not likely.  Musharraf 
indicated a return to civilian control.  If in the future he does not relinquish control, it 
may be in the interests of the United States to assist in his removal.  However, given the 
lack of political coalition that could form a stable government, it is possible to server U.S. 
interests better through the stability brought by Musharraf.  Furthermore, supporting 
Musharraf’s regime provides a way to stabilize Pakistan’s economy by supporting 
Musharraf’s policies and its implementation vice an American or western plan which 
could be viewed as intrusive.  Musharraf is the U.S.’s best short-run and medium-term 
weapon in Pakistan’s role as a front-line state in the War on Terrorism.  If supported now, 
his legacy may establish a long-term solution continued by subsequent democratically 
elected regimes.   
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Musharraf’s leadership, however, needs to stop dismantling the political parties 
hostile to his regime.  This will not contribute to stability in the eventual return of 
democracy to Pakistan.  The United States should continue support of Musharraf’s 
military regime, and, more importantly, ensure he creates the necessary foundations for 
the success of a future civilian government.  To allow Musharraf to surrender control too 
early would be to invite disaster for a democracy not ready to take the reigns of 
leadership.  This necessarily means that the United States should support an end to 
sectarian violence, support the growth of political parties, and provide continued 
economic stimulus with a long-term vision of bilateral relations.   
Pakistan and India stand on the unprecedented ground of dialogue in which the 
United States can assist both sides.  Pakistan must capitalize on its globalization efforts to 
continue on this path with its military used to take the first steps.  Pakistan’s military is 
the only truly unifying national institution in Pakistan.  As Pakistan’s military goes, so 
goes Pakistan. 
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